

## A SMALL STATE BETWEEN TWO MAJOR POWERS: NEPAL'S FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1816

Dhruba Raj Adhikari

### *Abstract*

*Nepal is a small state situated in a geo-strategic location between two major powers—China and India, the former being a great state, and the latter a middle state. Nepal has asymmetric relations with both India and China in terms of national power. Nepalese psyche has been shaped by the very geostrategic situation since the time immemorial. However, Nepal as a modern state was born only in 1768, since then it has adopted different strategies for its survival according to the changes in international, regional and domestic power equations. During the initial phase (1768-1814), Nepal was called Gorkha empire and it had pursued a grand strategy of sub-regional hegemony while being mindful of the sensibilities of the big powers in the North and the South. Nepal made a transition from imperial grand strategy to small power diplomacy in 1816 when it was defeated in Anglo-Nepal War (1814-16). From 1848, when Jung Bahadur came to power, Nepal started to fully bandwagon with the British colonialists in India. After that, Nepal had followed strategies of 'special relationship' with its neighbors, non-alignment, balancing, balking, neutrality, equidistance, equiproximity and trilateral cooperation depending upon changes in domestic, and regional as well as international politics.*

**Key Words:** Small State, Major Powers, Foreign Policy, Equi-proximity, Tri-lateral Cooperation.

### **Introduction**

Nepal is a small state geo-strategically located between two major powers—China, a great state in the North, and India, a middle state in the South. This geostrategic location has shaped the psyche of Nepalese elite, and hence its foreign policy. With the rise of China and India as the new economic powerhouses of the world, the vulnerabilities of the country have not increased only, its opportunity for greater economic cooperation with both the immediate neighbors also has enlarged. If Nepal can smartly formulate the strategies of small state economic diplomacy there are tremendous opportunities for Nepal's prosperity and development. The

new constitution promulgated in 2015 has laid the foundation for such foreign policy. According to Nepal's new constitution, Nepal pursues "an independent foreign policy based on the Charter of the United Nations, non-alignment, principles of *Panchsheel*, international law and the norms of world peace, taking into consideration of the overall interest of the nation" (*The Constitution of Nepal*, 2015, Clause 51 (m (1))). However, Nepal had to travel a long and tortuous way before being able to adopt this policy. This paper retraces the historical path Nepal travelled in the evolution of its foreign policy.

The primary research questions the paper addresses are: What are the strategies that Nepal employed in its history as a small state for its survival? Did the changes in the international, regional and domestic situations have any effect in the formulation of Nepal's foreign policy? If they had, what were such effects? Other secondary questions that the paper tries to inquire into are the following: What is a small state? Does Nepal satisfy the criteria for a small state? When did Nepal start to adopt small state diplomacy? To get answers to these questions, the paper has adopted qualitative research methods—historical and secondary document analysis.

The paper is organized into six sections. The first section introduces the topic and unfold research questions. The second section deals with the definitional problem of the concept 'small states' and tries to see whether Nepal is a small state or not. The third section postulates a theoretical framework for analysis. The fourth section retraces a historical background to the study. The fifth section is the main part of the research, where the evolution of Nepalese foreign policy in the final section.

### **Defining the Small States**

International Relations (IR) scholars use at least three terms, sometimes interchangeably, to connote the least powerful states in world politics: 'small states', 'weak states' and 'small powers'. However, the term 'small states' is chosen here because the latter two terms seem to be less suitable for the study. The reason for the choice is the following: the adjective 'weak' robs the concept of any plausibility of agency and the term 'small powers' is sometimes understood to be an oxymoron. Furthermore, the term 'weak' creates a kind of ambiguity about whether the state in question is weak internally or externally. The case in

the study is a small state between two major powers in the so-called third world, and it is not totally without agency.

In the disciplines of Social Sciences including IR, most of the concepts are contested. So is the concept 'small states'. First, there is a long standing debate on whether the concept is a useful analytical tool at all. For example, Peter R. Baehris is totally pessimistic about the utility of the concept as an analytical tool. In an article published in *World Politics*, which reviews two seminal works (Azar, 1973; Singer, 1972) in the field of Small State Studies, he suggests the following:

Whatever the criterion is adopted, small states form too broad a category for the purposes of analysis. There does, of course, exist a continuum of the size of states in international relations. However, notions of a sharp dichotomy between large and small states, and of a special role played by small states, should be discarded (Baehr, 1975, p. 466).

Despite Baehr's blanket dismissal of the concept, small state studies have persisted for more than six decades, and there is a general consensus among IR scholars on the necessity of further research on 'small states' as distinct category. Even then, there is still lack of cumulation and consensus on the definitional understanding of the concept (Long, 2017, p. 144). Moreover, 'scholars at least have three different communities in mind when they speak of "small states": microstates with a population of less than 1 million..., small states in developed world..., and small states in so-called third world' (Hey, 2003, p. 2). Present research is about a small state in the third world.

There are primarily four approaches to the definition of small states: quantitative, perceptual, behavioral and relational. The latter three are often called qualitative approaches. For the sake of convenience, let's start with the quantitative approach. There are divergent views within the *quantitative* school in terms of type and scope of measures. Some scholars argue that population should be the yardstick for categorizing states but others bat for Gross National Product (GNP) and geographical size. The third group of scholars argues for more sophisticated and combined measure. Among each group, disagreements persist about the cutoff point. To present some examples, Daniel Thurerputs the benchmark of 'fewer

than 10 million inhabitants' (Thurer, 1998, p. 37) for small states. Karl Deutch prefers GNP as a measure and a country with GNP that is 1 percent of that of World GNP is a small state (Karl Deutch referred in Baehr, 1975, p. 460). Maurice East and Bjorn Olafsson argue for composite measures to define small states, which include population, geographic size and GNP (plus military strength for East) (Olafsson, 1998; East, 1975).

David Vital's definition is more appropriate for the present purpose if we are to take a quantitative approach since it explicitly mentions about 'underdeveloped countries' as well. Vital categorizes countries around the world into three types—great, middle and small states. He further divides the latter into two groups—those in developed countries and those in underdeveloped countries. His "rough upper limit" of the population for the small states in developed countries is 10-15 million, to be defined as such. For the third world, a country having a population of 20-30 million can be considered as a small state (Vital, 1967, p. 294).

Secondly, the perceptual/psychological perspective defines a small state in terms of the perception of the 'self' and the 'other'. If any country and its leaders perceive themselves as being a small state and other countries also recognize them as such, then that country is a small state (Hey, 2003, p. 3). Robert Rothstein (1968) and Robert O. Keohane (1969) are among the proponents of perceptual/psychological perspective on small states. They do not completely jettison the importance of material dimensions, but they put more emphasis on national psychology. Rothstein offers the following definition of small states:

A small power is a state which recognizes that it cannot obtain security primarily by using its own capabilities and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes, or developments to do so; the Small Power's belief in its inability to rely on its own means must also be recognized by other states involved in international politics. (Rothstein *cited in* Keohane, 1969, p. 293).

Similarly, Keohane defines a small power as "a state whose leaders consider that it can never, acting alone or in a small group, make a significant impact on the system" (Keohane, 1969, p. 296).

Thirdly, *behavioral* approach defines small states according to their actual behavior in the practice of their foreign policies. If we are to follow this approach, small states are those states that exhibit limited involvement in global affairs, are primarily engaged in theregional level, basically, do not have the military option on the table, and are great champions of international law (Evans and Newnham, 1999, pp. 500-501).

Finally, after reviewing both the quantitative and qualitative approaches explained so far, some of the scholars have concluded that what matters most is power relation and “a small state is a part of the asymmetric relationship, which is unable to change the nature or functioning of the relationship on its own” (Archer, Bailes and Wivel, 2014, p. 9; *see also* Long, 2017). What is most significant here is the regional context and the relational nature of national power.

### **Is Nepal a Small State?**

Nepal is a small state by many standards. To begin with, it has a population of 28.98 million in 2016 according to the world bank data (World Bank, 2016), which is 1 million less than David Vital's cutoff limit for underdeveloped countries. Its GDP is 0.027 percentage of world GDP (World Bank, 2016), which is much less than the upper benchmark of 1 percent set by Karl Deutch. If we are to take the perceptual or psychological approach, most of the rulers of modern Nepal have accepted that Nepal is a small state and it is taken as such by the countries including the United States, China, and India. Nepal's founding father Prithvi Narayan Shah's following dictum is equally valid for Nepal's foreign policy in the present, if not more: “This kingdom is like a traul (yam) between two boulders. Great friendship should be maintained with the Chinese empire. Friendship should also be maintained with the emperor beyond the southern sea” (Prithvi Narayan Shah cited in Chaturvedy and Malone, 2012, p. 288).

In the regional context also, Nepal is a small state sandwiched between two major powers—China and India which are a great state, and middle state respectively. In terms of population, Nepal is 47.58 times smaller than China, and 45.68 times smaller than India (see *Figure: 3*). China's GDP is approximately 530 times bigger than that of Nepal. India's GDP is 107 times bigger than that of Nepal (see *Figure: 2*). If we are to consider military dimension, China's defense budget is 770 times bigger than that of Nepal, and India's defense budget is 242.85 times of Nepal's

defense budget. Geographically China is 65.20 times bigger than Nepal and India 22.33 times. These figures are enough to remind us about the ‘smallness’ of Nepal and its power asymmetry with its immediate neighbors.



Figure 1: Geography: Nepal Between India and China



Figure 2: GDP (World Bank, 2016)




Figure 3: Population (World Bank 2016)

## The Small States in International Politics

### A Theoretical Framework for Analysis

The international system is shaped by great powers. Small states are “system-ineffectual”- they cannot change the configuration of the international system (Keohane, 1969, p. 296). If great powers are ‘power suppliers’, small powers can be classified as ‘power consumers’ (Steven L. Spiegel *cited in* Amstrup, 1976, p. 170). What they can do is to adjust to it as smartly as possible. In classical and structural realist tradition, small states are not significant in international politics. The ancient Greek historian Thucydides famously wrote in *The History of Peloponnesian War, Book V* where Athenians say to Melians: “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must” (Strassler, 1996, p. 352). Classical realists think that small states survive just in case they do not harm the great powers, have the support of one of the great powers or if they have not attracted the attention of any great power. For, example Hans Morgenthau suggests that “Small nations have always owed their independence either to the balance of power or to their lack of attractiveness for imperialist aspiration” (Morgenthau, 1948 *cited in* Kassab, 2015, p. 2).

According to structural realism, the international system is determined by the distribution of capabilities among states (Waltz, 1979). However, small states have the very insignificant capability. Therefore, small states are not subjects of

that much attention for structural realists either, and whenever they have interest in small states that is only as entities that are ‘acted upon’ by major powers. For both classical and structural realists, the small states have very limited and primarily two choices in international politics—they must either bandwagon with or balance against great and middle powers. Nonetheless, if history is any guide, the choices available to small states are broader than the realist theories would generally indicate. For example, Kristen P. Williams, Steven E. Lobell, and Neal G. Jesse (2012) in the edited volume *Beyond Great Powers and Hegemons* have shown that “a continuum of possible strategies exist, moving from responses that directly oppose the hegemon and its interests (such as hard or soft balancing, balking, blackmail, leash-slipping) to neutrality to more accommodative responses (such as binding, bonding and band wagoning)” (Jesse and Dreyer, 2016, p. 33). In the present ‘international society’ (Bull, 1977; Watson, 1992) where the death rate of states is very low, and their sovereignty is respected and guaranteed, at least in principle, by being a member of global organizations like United Nations, the danger for small states of being coerced by regional powers into total submission has become less tenable.

To put the realist doctrine in a nutshell, the domestic politics does not have any significant role in the formation of the foreign policy of small states since their behavior is dictated by the constraints and opportunities present in the international structure. However, the domestic and constructivist theories on small states beg to differ with such realist doctrine. The domestic theories on foreign policy of a small state posit that the change in balance of power among different stakeholders in domestic politics, change in public opinion, and change of the regime or leadership can have significant impact on the evolution of foreign policy of a small state. Finally, constructivists argue that the change in identity and norms can cause change in perceived interest of a small state, and hence change in its foreign policy behavior (Jesse and Dreyer, 2016).

If we are to pull together the insights from different theories of International Relations reviewed in the above paragraphs, eight types of strategies can be employed by small states to survive and enhance their status in the international politics: a) ally with one major power to balance another major power, b) ally with small powers to balance a major power, c) bandwagon with the great power in the region, d) increase participation in regional and global organizations, e) remain

neutral (Amstrup, 1976; Reiter and Gartner, 2001), f) balking, g) soft balancing— i.e. balancing with non-military means and h) norm entrepreneurship.

The brief survey of the history of Nepal's foreign policy shows that Nepalese foreign policy is shaped by both the regional and international environment, and the changes in balance of power among different stakeholders in the domestic politics. As a small power between two major powers, Nepal has employed following strategies in its struggle for survival and development: 1) Bandwagoning with the British after defeat in Anglo-Nepal War, 2) "Special relations" with India (1950-55), 3) Diversification of foreign relations; 4) Non-alignment 5) Neutrality during regional war and balancing during regional peace, 6) Zone of Peace Proposal 7) equidistance, 8) equiproximity, 9) trilateral cooperation.

## **Historical Background**

### **From Imperial Grand Strategy to Small State Diplomacy**

In the early eighteenth century, Nepal was not a single entity as it is now. It was divided into many principalities—three kingdoms within the Kathmandu valley, so called *baisirajyas* or 22 mini-states and *chaubisirajyas* or 24 mini-states in the western part, and *Kirat* and *Limbuwan* in the east. There were other small principalities in the south as well. King Prithvi Narayan Shah started the campaign for the unification of Nepal in 1768 with the conquest of Kathmandu valley. His successors expanded Nepal from Kangra in the west to Tista in the East by the first decade of the nineteenth century with an ambition to expand Gorkha Empire as far west as Kashmir (Whelpton, 2005, pp. 19-34).

From the second half of the eighteenth century to the first decade of the nineteenth century, Nepal's Royal Palace harbored an imperial grand strategy of becoming a powerful sub-regional power. To fulfill that ambition, Prithvi Narayan Shah's dictum was not to offend the Chinese empire in the North and the British colonialists in the South, but to unify those small principalities in the sub-region. However, this grand strategy of keeping the major powers neutral while annexing the small sub-regional 'micro-states' into the Gorkha Empire did not translate into practice. Ultimately, Nepal collided with the great powers both in the North and the South. Nepal went to war with China in 1792 which permanently delimited its

Northern border, and it fought a two-years-long war with the British in (1814-16) and Nepal lost disastrously.

The dispute of the allegedly debased coins supplied by Nepal to Tibet, Nepal's grant of refuge to the Tibetan 10<sup>th</sup> *Samarpa Lama* and the mistreatment of Nepalese traders in Lasha led to the first Nepali-Tibetan war. When the dispute could not be resolved through dialogues, Nepal invaded Tibet in 1788. The war ended with the signing of *Treaty of Kerung* between the representatives of Tibet and Nepal in 1789. According to the treaty, Tibet had to pay tribute to Nepal every year. However, Tibet refused to pay the tribute to Nepal Durbar (Royal Palace) from the following year and demanded the nullification of the treaty. Simultaneously, Tibet requested the Chinese emperor for military assistance. The Chinese emperor was quite offended by Nepal's expansionist behavior since Tibet was under the suzerain protection of the Qing empire. However, Nepal's reckless foreign policy behavior did not stop there, and it attacked Tibet for the second time in 1791 and looted monasteries in Kuti. The Qing empire asked Nepal to return the property looted during the second attack to Tibet, and also to return Smarpa Lama to Tibet. However, Nepal refused to yield to Chinese pressure, which resulted in China-Nepal War in 1792. Nepal was vanquished by China in the war and ultimately it had to accept suzerain status along with Tibet (Stiller, 2017, pp. 186-206).

The Anglo-Nepal War (1814-16) was more disastrous for Nepal. It ended with the Sugauly Treaty in 1816, and Nepal lost a big chunk of its territory to the British East Indian Company. During the war with the British, Nepal made desperate attempts to garner support from the emperor in China, the great power in the North. However, Chinese found the then Nepalese rulers very unreliable and opportunist, and they refused to provide any help (Rose, 1971, p. 86). Nepal also tried to make an alliance with other small states such as Punjab and Gwalior in the Indian subcontinent (Stiller, 2017, pp. 334-339). They also did not cooperate with Nepal since Nepalese were the biggest threat in the sub-regional level for their survival. Nepal failed in its attempt to forge alliances with the great power in the North against the great power in the South. Nor could it succeed to make an anti-British alliance among the small states in the sub-continent. Ultimately, Nepal could not withstand the British might and had to sign Sugauly Treaty that was the final nail in the coffin of Nepal's imperial grand strategy. Then, Nepal had to make its transition from the imperial grand strategy to small state diplomacy.

## **Evolution of Nepalese Foreign Policy after 1816**

### **Bandwagoning with the British (1816-1947)**

Even after being disastrously defeated by both the Chinese and the British, Nepal Durbar had not fully abandoned its aspiration for becoming a powerful state at least in the sub-regional level. Bhim Sen Thapa's attempt to modernize Nepalese army in the post Anglo-Nepalese War period provides evidence of such residual aspirations. However, by the mid-nineteenth century, Nepal fully realized the futility of such grand strategic aspirations, and it wholeheartedly embraced the strategy of small power diplomacy. Janga Bahadur Rana, who became the new Prime Minister of Nepal on 19 September 1846 through *Kot Parva*-- a massacre of his opponents in Nepalese Durbar (Vaidya, 2000), decided to align Nepal's foreign policy with that of British. The reason behind that was two-fold. The first reason was the unprecedented weakening of China after its defeat at the hand of British in the First Opium War (1839-1842). The second rationale for this decision lied in the domestic politics. Janga Bahadur consistently needed a strong backing to defend his regime at home from any kind of internal coup which used to happen frequently within the Durbar in Kathmandu.

As a part of the strategy of bandwagoning with the British, Jung Bahadur offered help to British rulers when sepoy mutiny erupted in India. On 10<sup>th</sup> of December 1857, the prime minister himself led 8,000 men strong Nepalese army contingent into India to suppress the mutiny of Indian armymen against the British. British rulers in Calcutta were impressed with the Nepalese Prime Minister and they took a decision to restore a part of Nepalese land in the western Terai which Nepal had lost to the British in the Anglo-Nepal War four decades ago. The territory that Nepal gained by aligning with the British rather than fighting them was then called 'Naya Muluk' which includes four districts—Bake, Bardia, Kailali and Kanchanpur of present-day Nepal.

During the Rana period, Nepal's foreign policy was aligned with that of British India. Nepal sent 10 battalions of Nepalese army to fight World War I on the side of the allies, and 55,000 more Nepali men were recruited into British Gurkha battalions in India (Rose, 1971, p. 170). As soon as World War II broke out in 1939, Nepal again sent 10 battalions of Nepal Army personnel to the battlefield, and more than 200, 000 Nepalese men served in British units during the period of the war (Rose, 1971, p. 172).

As *quid pro quo* for Nepal's bandwagoning with them, British granted the status of an independent state to Nepal in a treaty signed on December 21, 1923. However, Nepal was kept within the British sphere of influence and "Kathmandu would continue to "consult" the government of India on relations with Tibet, Sikkim, Bhutan, and China". Nepal established its Legation in London only in 1934, which was another step in the process of recognition of Nepal's independent status.

After India got independence from the British rule in 1947, the autocratic Ranas ruled Nepal for three more years. In a desperate attempt to save their regime from the regional political upsurge and democratic revolution at home, the Rana Government signed the 'Peace and Friendship Treaty' with independent India in 1950. The treaty helped India to mantle British policy for Nepal and keep its preeminence in the Himalayan Kingdom.

#### **'Special Relations' with India (1950-1955)**

Until the collapse of Rana regime in the face of armed revolution initiated and led by Nepali Congress in 1950, Nepalese rulers, for the most part of its history, did not have substantial contact with other nations except with various rulers in the Indian subcontinent, British colonialists, Tibet and occasionally China (Levi, 1957, p. 236; Bista, 2012, p. 27). During the Rana period, it bandwagoned with the British colonialists in India. In the immediate aftermath of the Indian independence in 1947, it aligned its foreign policy with independent India. This alignment is also termed as 'special relations' between the two and it was formalized in 'The Treaty of "Peace and Friendship" between the Government of India and the Government of Nepal' on 31 July 1950. Ranas had acquiesced to the Indian security demands in their desperate move to protect their teetering regime from possible democratic usurp. After the advent of democracy, the 'special relations' with India were further strengthened.

There were a number of reasons for the emergence of the 'special relations' between Nepal and India. At the individual level of analysis, it was the indebtedness of King Tribhuvan and Nepali Congress leaders towards India for providing support for democratic revolution. King Tribhuvan had fled, with his family, to Embassy of India to Nepal in Kathmandu on 6 November 1950, was flown to India boarding a special plane of Indian Air Force and had taken asylum in Delhi from 7 November 1950 to 18 February 1951. He had returned to the

Nepalese throne only after the tripartite Delhi settlement among the king, Nepali Congress and the Ranas. Similarly, the personal level relation between leaders of the Congress Party of India and Nepali congress leaders who had participated in Independence movement in India also contributed the special relation.

At the domestic level, the second factor behind the 'special relations' was the imperative of state-building in the post-revolution Nepal. As Rana oligarchy was based on family rule, institutional structures of Nepali state that were handed down to the new dispensation were very feeble. The modernization of the bureaucracy, security agencies and the governance was proving to be herculean task for the new establishment (Muni, 2016, pp. 65-66). More than that, the Nepalese state was not able to monopolize the legitimate use of political violence within its territory. To put it another way, the new ruling elite was not fully secure from domestic rebellions across the country. At that time, Nepalese state was militarily so weak that it had to seek help from Indian army to suppress internal rebellions, for example, the refusal by KI Singh to lay down arms after Delhi settlement, and peasant rebellion led by Bhim Datta Panta in the Western Nepal in 1952-53 (Whelpton, 2013).

At regional level, first, the "special relationship" between India and Nepal in the beginning of 1950s was a product of "Himalayan frontier policy" the independent India inherited from the British Raj "under which the Himalayas were regarded as a second frontier" (Subedi, 1994, p. 274). The "special relationship" was, despite having strong roots in domestic politics of Nepal as well, rather an idea enforced by the Indian establishment than a voluntary foreign policy formulated by Nepal. Nepal was keen to diversify its foreign relations even during the last phase of the Rana Regime and the initial phase of democratic dispensation. However, India actively throttled such aspirations on the Nepalese side. For example, when the US communicated with Nepal seeking approval to establish embassy in Kathmandu in 1951, India suggested Nepal to turn down such proposal and Nepal followed Indian advice (Feer, 1953, p. 140). A similar proposal from the Chinese government the same year was rejected by Nepal on India's behest (Brown, 1971, p. 665; Dai, 1963, p. 88). The reason behind such pressure from India on Nepal was that after losing its "outer buffer Tibet", the new Indian establishment that had inherited Raj mentality in its approach to national security was alarmed and its presence in the "inner buffers"—Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim was not to be

loosened at any cost (Feer, 1953, p. 137; Levi, 1957, pp. 241-242). Moreover, India wanted to keep the “Himalayan buffer kingdom” out of both the communist and the Western hands and avoid Cold War contest in its immediate neighborhood (Brown, 1971; Feer, 1953).

Second, the ambiguous practice of official exchange between the Tibet and Nepal in the beginning of 1950s had established an uneasy relation between People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Nepal, and this also contributed indirectly to the “special relationship” between India and Nepal. A section of Nepalese ruling class was suspicious about Chinese motives regarding not only Tibet but also Nepal (Dai, 1963, p. 88), and this suspicion was to some extent implanted by the Tibetan and Indian establishment itself (Upadhyaya, 2012, p. 72). Third, Nepal’s presumed status of being China’s tributary state discussed in some circles within and outside China also contributed to the fear among the erstwhile Nepalese ruling elite about the true intentions of China which further pushed Nepal into Indian sphere of influence. In fact, the Chinese government, after taking control over Tibet in 1910, had “laid claim to suzerainty over Nepal” (Feer, 1953, p. 137). Finally, to bring in constructivist insight here, the newly gained democratic identity of Nepal and India on the one hand, and communist identity of China on the other defined the interests of China and Nepal in somewhat incompatible terms initially.

At the level of international system, the tacit support of United States, the new world hegemon after World War II, and the United Kingdom, the previous hegemon and the ex-colonial masters of India also contributed to the India’s special presence in Nepal and hence Nepal’s special relation with the same (Muni, 2016, p. 63).

### **First major thrust for Diversification of Relations (1955-1965)**

Nepal could expedite the diversification of the diplomatic relations only after 1955 when Mahendra became the new king of the country after the death of his father. Werner Levi claims that the diversification was a result of initiation from foreign countries rather than Nepal (Levi, 1957, p. 236). However, such a claim is untenable given the fact that the diversification of foreign relations was one of the most important factors that guaranteed the survival of Nepal as a small state

between two giant neighbors in post-1950 regional and international political environment, and it was one of the major planks of the foreign policy of the new king (*see* Brown, 1971, p. 665; Mehra, 1994, p. 851). Without the diversification of foreign relations, a 'buffer state' like Nepal could not have survived or avoided "the formal loss of control over foreign policy to" (Fazal, 2007 *cited in* Jesse and Dreyer, 2016, p. 25) the southern neighbor, to put it more concretely, could not have avoided the fate of Sikkim or Bhutan.

Several factors in domestic, regional and international politics made the first major thrust for the diversification of Nepal's international relations possible. To start with, at the domestic level, unlike his father Tribhuvan, Mahendra did not have the special indebtedness towards India. In fact, as an ambitious and independent minded crown prince, Mahendrawas already active in the machinations among the power elite (Levi, 1956) and at loggerheads with Nepali Congress leaders in the government, who were presumed to have special relations with Indian establishment. Mahendra was ready to go against Indian wishes if that impeded his political ambitions and purportedly Nepal's national interest. Within a very short period of 'special relationship', the Indian highhandedness had led to significant resentment among Nepalese public against India. The unequal 1950 'peace and friendship treaty', a similar Trade Treaty that robbed Nepal of its independence in having its own foreign exchange, and import and export duties, the presence of Indian representative in cabinet meeting of the Nepalese government and the posting of Indian security agencies in the Northern border of Nepal, and ultimately India's visible role in nomination of the prime ministers in the short lived consecutive governments flared the smoldering resentment that was already present among Nepalese public against India (Levi, *Nepal in World Politics*, 1957, pp. 240-241; Brown, 1971, p. 665; Muni, 2016). Such public sentiment became an important asset for king Mahendra in his attempt for diversification of diplomatic relations.

The opportunity for the diversification of the relations was becoming more conducive in the regional level as well. A major development in regional politics in that direction was the agreement signed by India and PRC regarding Tibet, in which the principles of *Panchasheel* were formulated for the first time, and Tibet was formally recognized by India as the integral part of PRC. This bilateral agreement between India and China opened door for Nepal to reestablish its

diplomatic relations with China and the principles of *Panchasheel* proved to be very significant discursive resources for Nepal to assert its independence and sovereignty in the coming days. As a major success in its pursuit for diversification of relations, Nepal reestablished diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China in 1955. Chinese premiere Chao En-Lai visited Nepal in 1957. However, Chinese embassy was opened in Nepal only in August 1960. The same year, in April, Nepal signed 'Sino-Nepal Peace and Friendship Treaty' with China.

The United States had recognized Nepal as an independent country in 1947 and signed a treaty of friendship and commerce. Nepal had established a Legation to the United States on 16 February 1948. However, Embassy of United States was opened in Kathmandu only on 6<sup>th</sup> of August 1959 (Office of the Historian). Germany established its embassy in Kathmandu in 1963, and the Embassy of Nepal to Germany was established in 1965. During 1960s, Nepal expanded its official diplomatic relations with almost fifty countries. By 1969, eleven countries had maintained their embassies in Kathmandu, and Nepal opened its embassies in twelve countries around the world (Brown, 1971, p. 665). Nepal continued with its diversification policies and now it has diplomatic relations with 144 countries, the Republic of Burundi being the latest to establish such ties with Nepal.

At the level of international structure, Nepal officially became a member of international society when it was granted the membership to United Nations (UN) on 14 December 1955 (Muni, 2016, p. 142). Nepal's membership to the global inter-state organization was the biggest guarantee for its survival as a nation-state in the post-World War II global order. Nepal had applied for a UN membership seven year back. However, a Soviet veto had blocked Nepal's accession to the world body in 1949. The Soviet Union blocked Nepal's membership in UN presumably because Nepal already had diplomatic relationship with the United Kingdom and the United States. (Chicago Tribune, 1949). However, after ward the Soviet Union clarified that it had nothing against Nepal, and Nepal got a membership to the world body.

To sum up, the diversification of the diplomatic relations and membership of the UN were vital assets for Nepal to assert its independence and sovereignty, and to avoid the fate of Sikkim and Bhutan in the sub-regional politics of South Asia.

### **Non-alignment (1955-1990)**

Nonalignment was another major plank of Nepal's foreign policy in the Cold War era. The concepts of 'neutrality' and 'non-alliance' are sometimes confused in journalistic writings. However, these two concepts are not the same. According to Tulukder Maniruzzaman, "[w]hile neutrality means a state's opting out of international politics so that it can avoid involvement in any future war, non-alignment, as it is understood since the beginning of the Cold War, means avoidance by a state of any military pact with any of the power blocs" (Maniruzzaman, 1982, p. 32). While neutrality is a juridical concept and stresses on non-participation in the controversies of regional and world politics, non-alignment is political practice with strong sense of agency (Maniruzzaman, 1982, p. 32). To be more precise, non-alignment called for not non-involvement (as in case of neutrality) but active participation of world affairs by taking independent principled stand on major issues of concern to the international community without the inclination to side with the any of the two power blocs.

Bijay Sen Budhraj has pointed out three benefits of non-alignment—First, it made it possible for underdeveloped non-aligned countries from the Third World to get financial aid from both the blocs for their economic development. Second, it "contributed to the maintenance of peace and relaxation of tensions" (Budhraj, 1966, p. 49). Third, it enabled "arelatively weak, both militarily and economically newly independent country", for example, a middle power or a small state "to play major role on the stage of world politics—a role out of proportion of its military strength" (Budhraj, 1966, p. 49).

The first step towards the non-alignment movement was, in fact, the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian nations held on 18-24 April 1955 in Indonesia. However, the First Conference of Heads of States or Governments of Non-Aligned Countries was convened in Belgrade on 1-6 September 1961 (Baral, 1981). King Mahendra himself led the delegation to the conference which signified the amount of importance Nepal attached to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The NAM countries were fully committed to the *Principles of Panchasheel* including respect for each other's sovereignty and peaceful coexistence. In the speech delivered at the Conference, King Mahendra said:

The principle of peaceful co-existence, when used negatively in the sense of military non-involvement, becomes one of non-alignment. Belief in the policy of non-alignment implies in our opinion rejection of the theory that the challenge of the modern world is a military challenge (King Mahendra *cited in* Baral, 1981, p. 262).

Through the NAM platform, Nepal highlighted the inequality among nations in the world and importance of economic development in the countries of Asia and Africa. Nepal also raised voice for the justice among nations in international relations.

### **Strategies of Balancing in Peace and Neutrality in War**

Neutrality was a vital element of Nepalese foreign policy especially when the immediate neighbors India and China had significant cross border disputes or war. During the border war between China and India in 1962, Nepal was able to maintain its neutrality in the face of Indian pressure to side with it. For Indian establishment, “Mahendra’s assertion of neutrality amounted to a brazen repudiation of the 1950 Peace and Friendship Treaty” (Upadhyaya, 2012, p. 90; *see also* Dabhade and Pant, 2004). However, Mahendra could not be cowed and refused to take side tactfully. Recently, during Doklam standoff between China and India in 2017 also Nepal successfully maintained its neutral position and tactfully refrained from making any comments on the issue.

During period of peace in the Asian region specially between India and China, Nepal adopted a very tactful policy of ‘balancing’, some authors would call it ‘soft balancing’, and balking, i.e. ignoring or avoiding the demands of the great powers when it is against the national interest of the country (Jesse, Lobell, Press-Barnathan, and Williams, 2012). Nepal’s ability to solve the dispute about Mt. Everest with China basically in favour of Nepal, and its success to register protest for border transgression by People’s Liberation Army and get apology from Chinese side in the 1960s were example of Nepal’s successful agency in the relations with the northern neighbor (Muni, 2016, pp. 93-94). Similarly, the diversification of the foreign relations after 1955 despite Nehru’s public displeasure, removal of Indian security agencies from Nepal’s border with the Tibet region of PRC in the end of 1950s and opening of Kodari highway that linked Kathmandu with the Tibet region of PRC during 1963-1967 going against

the apprehension and wishes of India are some of the examples of successful *balking* in Nepal's relation with the sub-regional hegemon.

The balancing act by Nepal between India and China was like a diplomatic dance sometimes being seemingly tilted towards one, and other times towards the other. It was not balancing in traditional sense of 'balance of power'. Its objective was more limited and was primarily aimed at minimizing restrictions on Nepal's freedom to pursue its independent foreign policy and enhancing its national security. Nepal had to pay some price specially in its relations with India for this diplomatic dance of balancing. As Dev Raj Dahal has rightly pointed out, "Nepal's balancing act between India and China has always been precarious akin to a game of national self-assertion versus regional accommodation... The balancing act would have been a viable strategy had Nepal achieved self-sufficiency on essential goods" (Dahal, 2011, p. 43). One example of such a precariousness was "India's imposition in late 1989 of trade blockade on landlocked Nepal in reprisal for its import of arms from China" which led to shortage of the most essential goods such as fuel, cooking oil, salt and gas and it also weakened the monarchy especially in the context of political change in 1990 (Dahal, 2011, p. 43; *see also* Koirala, 1990).

### **The Zone of Peace Proposal**

The Zone of Peace proposal, the lynchpin of King Birendra's foreign policy, was another major innovation in Nepal's foreign policy during the Panchayat period. In February 1975, King Birendra proposed Nepal as 'a Zone of Peace' (ZOP) while speaking to the representatives of foreign countries attending his crowning ceremony (Anand, 1977). In his address to the foreign dignitaries, King Birendra made following statement:

As heirs to one of the most ancient civilizations in Asia, our natural concern is to preserve our independence—a legacy handed down to us by history. The absence of peace will delay, make more difficult and even deform our development. Just as a world without peace will jeopardize our traditional independence. (King Birendra *cited in* Sharma, 2004, p. 47)

The ZOP was a part of an attempt to assert Nepal's independence from Indian hegemonic behavior (Scholz, 1977). The rationale king Birendra presented for the ZOP proposal was that the proposal represented Nepal's "overriding concern for peace and development" and its "realization that one is not possible without the other" (Vaidya and Bajracharya, 1996, p. 244). China, US, and the Soviet Union immediately welcomed the proposal. However, India did not support it because "New Delhi saw the ZOP proposal as a brazen attempt to circumvent the "special relations" between the two countries it believed the 1950 treaty had enshrined" (Upadhyaya, 2012, p. 103). The ZOP proposal was a result of Nepal's attempt to safeguard its sovereignty both from internal and external threats. It was proposed because Nepalese monarchy was anxious about its future and national security of the country from India given the increasing Indian sponsored anti-monarchy unrest and continuous meddling of Indian security and intelligence agencies in the internal politics of neighboring Sikkim, another Himalayan "buffer state". Ultimately, Sikkim was officially annexed into India after two months on 26 March 1975 (*see also* Datta-Ray, 1984). ZOP was proposed "[t]o symbolize that Nepal no longer was included under Indian defense umbrella" and to "guarantee that no foreign power would use Nepal as a military base" (Scholz, 1977, p. 203)

Moreover, Nepalese state was facing communist rebellions in the eastern part of the country and these communist rebels were claiming Chairman Mao Zedong as their helmsman. This intriguing situation had contributed to the feeling of insecurity among the Panchayati ruling elite and the then Nepalese king devised ZOP probably drawing on the similar proposal of 'Zone of Peace' by Sri Lanka at the 26<sup>th</sup> United Nations General Assembly in 1971. The proposal had led to the declaration of Indian ocean as Zone of Peace. In the same year, 'Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality' was proposed by the members of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The choice of words 'Zone of Peace' in line with Sri Lankan proposal rather than using additional words such as 'neutrality' and 'freedom' following ASEAN proposal is notable here. In case 'neutrality' had been added, it would have connoted passivity in international politics and 'freedom' would have gone against the grain of Panchayati doctrine.

### **The 'Opening Up' and Departure from Panchayati Foreign Policy (1990 onwards)**

The collapse of Soviet Union ushered in a new era of triumphalism for liberal democracy. Riding the new global wave of democratization, Nepal went through a second democratic revolution. The thirty-year-old Panchayati regime was toppled down through *Jana Aandolan*—people's movement, and multiparty parliamentary democratic system with constitutional monarchy was established in the country. Restoration of democracy brought in some significant changes in Nepalese foreign policy.

In the immediate aftermath of the establishment of the multiparty democracy, "interim Prime Minister Krishna Prasad Bhattarai called for a return of "natural ties" with India" (Upadhyaya, 2012, p. 119). This was a setback to the policy of balancing and equidistance that was established during the Panchayati period. More over, as Upadhyaya has explicitly mentioned, "[t]he new government, which had already repudiated king Birendra's Zone of Peace proposal as irrelevant in the new political context, reaffirmed the validity of the 1950 treaty" (Upadhyaya, 2012, p. 119). It is difficult to verify Upadhyaya's claim specially about Prime Minister Bhattarai's alleged reaffirmation of a controversial treaty like 1950 treaty between India and Nepal given the level of negative sentiment among the Nepalese public about the same. However, it was true that Nepal tried to revive the 'special relations' with India for a brief period after the restoration of democracy in 1990, and during the multi-party system period (1990-2005), Nepal's internal and regional/international politics got more enmeshed with each other.

As Nepal opened its doors to the outside world, it started a campaign of liberalization and privatization under the guidance of World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF). Given Nepal's sensitive geostrategic location and vulnerability of the economy of a small state, the unrestricted opening up actually jeopardized Nepalese economic and security interests. The unfettered neo-liberalization of the economy especially the structural adjustment programs became the cause of more unemployment, displacement of manpower and increased income and wealth inequality in the economy. The budding domestic industries could not sustain competition with the multinational corporations which resulted in the deindustrialization of the Nepalese economy. The economic elite and the middle-class people of the country increasingly became victim of

consumerism and 'conspicuous consumption'. In the security arena, India, the US and China became entangled into the strategic game of security in the Himalayan region. The political parties and various factions within these parties developed proximity with one or another great power, and they themselves occasionally acted as the proxies of different international interest groups, which further complicated the economic and military vulnerability of Nepal as a small state.

### **Civil War and Increasing US Footprint (1996-2005)**

In 1996, Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) launched a 'People's War' (PW) with the aim of establishing a New Democratic System in Nepal. With the increase of Maoist influence in Nepal, the government directed its foreign policy initiatives to gather international support for the suppression of the rebels. After the terror attack in the US on 11 September 2001 by the Muslim fundamentalists, US started so-called global war on terrorism. Nepalese government had already declared its domestic rebels as terrorists. US government also listed Nepalese Maoists as 'terrorist outfit', and the US provided financial, logistical and training help to Nepalese army. During 2001-2005 period, US footprint in Nepal became larger (Banerjee, 2002). On January 18, 2002, U.S. secretary of State Colin Powell arrived in Kathmandu and expressed support for the Nepalese government's fight against Maoist insurgency (Mage, 2007, p. 1836). Highlighting increased cooperation between US and Nepal government, John Page further writes:

Shortly afterwards the Bush administration announced it was seeking an initial special appropriation of \$20 million for the Nepalese security forces, and a team of US military advisors from the US Pacific Command arrived in Nepal, including a colonel of the US Marine Corps, the chief of logistic plans division and the deputy chief of engineering. This group was followed by mobile teams that worked with RNA ground units on matter of military tactics. Programmes that had for years brought RNA officers to US military schools were greatly expanded. RNA officers were sent to US Army War College, the US Army and General Staff Colleges, the National Defense University and the Pacific Center for Strategic studies (Mage, 2007, p. 1836).

Nepalese Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba visited Washington and London the same year to garner international support against Maoists at home. He met with both President of United States, George W. Bush and the Prime Minister

of the United Kingdom, Tony Blair. The United States had harder line about the Maoists. Even though their public statements were more nuanced, the focus of the US administration was initially on the military solution, however, Europeans had “placed greater hope on negotiated settlement” (Upadhyaya, 2012, p. 135). India had adopted a paradoxical policy towards Maoists. On the one hand, Indian establishment was providing support to the Nepalese government in its fight against the Nepalese Maoists who had links with Indian Maoists. On the other, India was being very strategic when it came to the cracking down on Nepalese Maoist leaders who were hiding within Indian territory. Indian establishment was, in fact, looking for the possibility of using Maoist issue as a leverage in its bargains with Nepalese government ( *see also* Mishra, 2004).

Thus, the civil war increased the vulnerability of Nepal regarding regional and international influence on Nepalese politics. Maoists claimed themselves to be anti-imperialist and anti-expansionist forces but as Shoubhagya Shah has rightly pointed out, “[p]aradoxically, movements that promise liberation may deepen dependency when the intensification of the struggle causes the protagonists to raise their bids for external support in order to vanquish internal foes” (Shah, 2004, p. 215). Not only during the conflict but also in post-conflict republican Nepal as well, the external intervention in Nepalese politics in the pretext of human rights and minority rights, and rule of law, as a manifestation of excessive obsession among the Westerners with their own ‘higher’ values, has not ended yet. Nepalese and experiences from some other third world countries tells us that once international agencies get into a small and weak country, they do not easily choose to get out of the country. That is why Nepalese government had to terminate the mandate of United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) and the United Nations Human Rights Office in Nepal (OHCHR- Nepal) in 2001 going against the will of these agencies, even though they were established at the request and with the consent of political parties in Nepal including the then Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and the government of Nepal. In a recent attempt to get rid of interference of international agencies, on 11 June 2018, government of Nepal ordered to closure of Office of the United Nations Department of Political Affairs in Kathmandu.

To get back into the discussion on civil war era, in 2005, King Gyanendra, who had become new king few years back when the then king's family was massacred

inside the royal palace by the then crown prince Dipendra, took power into his hand and launched a coup against parliamentary parties. King's move contributed indirectly to the formation of alliance between the parliamentarians and the Maoists against royal autocracy. The alliance was supposedly mediated by the Indian government whose relationship with the new king had already started to sour. With the change in the alliance among different stakeholders in Nepal's domestic politics, international dynamics also started to take a U-turn. After the initiation of the second *Janaadolan* in 2006, the western powers and India, respecting the public opinion in Nepal, stopped providing political support and supplying arms and ammunition to the king's army. Furthermore, Sridhar K. Khatri observes that during that period, the western diplomatic agencies including US embassy in Nepal "were openly involved in bringing about political change to Nepal" to such an extent that they royal government was compelled to accuse them of "engaging in undiplomatic activities" (Khatri, 2012, p. 77).

After being isolated from much of the international community, king Gyanendra tried to play 'China card' in a desperate move to gather support for his illegitimate regime. Though China was ready to provide military support to the Nepalese king, Chinese establishment was not calling Maoists the "terrorists". The term they used was "anti-government outfit". (Upadhya, 2012, pp. 134-136). However, use of such language on China's part regarding Nepalese Maoist was mostly due to their unwillingness to use the "terrorist" term loosely as usually the Westerners do. Chinese establishment was, in fact, very critical of Nepalese Maoists for 'misusing' Chairman Mao's name and it provided unwavering support to Nepalese government in its various campaigns to suppress the Maoist rebels. China rethought about its previous stand about Nepalese Maoists only after Maoists came to peace process in 2006.

### **The Concept of 'Equiproximity' and Tri-lateral Cooperation (2006 onwards)**

#### 5.9.1 Equidistance or equiproximity?

After royal takeover in 2005, the parliamentarian parties and the Maoists in Nepal forged an alliance to launch *Jana Aandolan-II*, the second mass movement that led to the Peace Process in 2006 between the Nepali state and Maoist rebels. In 2008, election to the constituent assembly was held, from which CPN (Maoist) emerged as the single largest party, and Maoist supremo Prachanda became the

Prime Minister of the country. Prachanda chose China as the first destination for a foreign visit despite India's mounting pressure, even though he expressed his second thought after returning from China. Prachanda stressed the importance of equiproximity with both the neighbors rather than any 'special relationship' with India (Dahal, 2011, p. 45).

After the establishment of republics, and with the rise of both China and India, Nepalese strategic thinkers have put more emphasis on the policy of *equiproximity* recently. According to Dhurba Kumar "equiproximity" is

a conception guaranteeing a balanced relation with both India and China. Sovereign equality remains central to this proposition. In so doing, Nepal should advisedly undertake an effort to review all the previous treaties and discard the ones that had proved unfavorable to the country's national interests. The thrust of the argument conclusively points towards ending the special relationship with India, which restricts Nepal's freedom to maintain a meaningful relation with China, nowhere has this feeling been reflected more concretely in recent memory than in the case of China arms versus Indian blockade (Cited in Pandey, 2009, p. 58)

The concept of 'equiproximity' is preferred to 'equidistance' because the former means having an equally proximate relationship with both China and India to solicit cooperation in the economic and infrastructure development of Nepal, while the latter has more strategic and security-related connotation. Nepal needs to have equally sound relations with China and India for its prosperity and development.

#### 5.9.2 Proposal for Tri-lateral Cooperation

Another new development in Nepalese foreign policy after the establishment of republics is its proposal of tri-lateral cooperation among China, Nepal, and India in especially tourism development, and infrastructure building including hydroelectric sector. The reason behind the proposal for the tri-lateral cooperation in hydropower development in Nepal is that China possesses the technology and technical know-how for big power plants, and India has the market for electricity. The proposal for tri-lateral cooperation among China, Nepal, and India was put forward by the Prachanda-led government in 2009 and is emphasized by the

communist majority government led by chairman KP Sharma Oli recently. In his visit to China in June 2018, prime minister KP Oli reiterated Nepal's desire to become bridge between China and India.

Nepal signed on China's 'One Belt, One Road' (OBOR) project on 12 May 2017. Nepal is trying very hard to convince India also to take part in OBOR but India has opposed it so far. However, within India itself there are more than one views regarding OBOR. Ultimately, India will have to sign on OBOR project, otherwise, it will be isolated from its neighbors in South Asia. Nepal wants China and India to have a better relationship and cooperate in infrastructure building in Nepal, for which OBOR can become a useful framework. The main goal of Republican Nepal in its neighborhood policy is to become a 'vibrant economic bridge' between the two economic powerhouses of the world—China and India.

Even though Nepal wants to play a proactive role to facilitate a cordial relationship between China and India and make the dream of the Rise of Asia a reality in the twenty-first century, the realist thinking predominant among especially the Indian establishment has frustrated Nepal's such benign initiative. Another problem related to the proposal of trilateral cooperation is: Nepal, being a small state, has very little economic clout and diplomatic resources to materialize it. The liberals also might not find the trilateral cooperation that attractive since Nepal is a very small market compared to China and India. However, if we are to draw from constructivist insight, Nepal can, in fact, become a bridge between the two ancient civilizations which never went for war in the ancient past. To materialize the proposal for tri-lateral cooperation, Nepal needs to be able to redefine its identity or refocus on its identity as a meeting place of two great civilizations. The foreign policy that ensues from civilizational identities of Nepal, China and India will have completely different paradigm compared to the foreign policy that ensues from the identities of nation-states.

### **Conclusion**

Small states can be defined by different measures—quantitative, i.e. in terms of geographical size, GDP, population, military strength, or qualitative, i.e. national psychology/perception, behavior in foreign relations, and power asymmetry in the regional context. By most of the measures, Nepal can be categorized as a small state. However, in the 18th and the beginning of 19<sup>th</sup> century, Nepal's foreign

policy was driven by imperial grand strategy rather than small state diplomacy. Only after the disastrous defeat in Anglo-Nepal war (1814-16), Nepal embraced small state diplomacy. Nepal has employed different strategies of small state foreign policy depending on the international situation in the last two centuries. Initially, it bandwagoned with British imperialists from 1816-1947. After India got independence, it pursued a foreign policy of 'special relationship' with India for few years. However, Nepal also took steps to diversify its foreign relations and applied for participation in United Nations. The membership of United Nations in 1955 was one of the most significant moment for Nepal in its entire struggle for survival in the anarchical international system.

Nepalese foreign policy was strongly influenced by the change in the domestic political system. After King Mahendra took power in 1960 and established a partyless Panchayati system, Nepal adopted a foreign policy of non-alignment, balancing during period of peace and neutrality during the period of war rather than having any special relations with its immediate neighbors. After the end of Cold War, Nepal also was swept by the worldwide liberal democratic wave. As a result, the Panchayati system collapsed and multiparty democracy was established in Nepal. During Multiparty and Constitutional Monarchy period (1990-2005), Nepal opened upto the world, and its foreign policy was to some extent guided by liberal ideology. In this period, US footprint became larger in Nepalese domestic and foreign policies. With the escalation of the civil war, Nepal became more vulnerable not only to US influence but also to all external influences. For a brief period in 2005 when King Gyanendra usurped power, he became isolated from the broader international community and tried to reach out to China in desperation, but this could not save his regime from collapse. After the establishment of republics, Nepal is trying to have a foreign policy of 'equiproximity' with its immediate neighbors China—a great state, and India—a middle state. Nepal also aims to become a vibrant economic bridge between China and India, and it wants to promote trilateral cooperation among China, Nepal, and India. To materialize the new effort for trilateral cooperation between Nepal, China and India, Nepal needs to focus on the civilizational identities of each of the three countries. Refocus on Nepal's identity as meeting place of two great civilizations has potential to create new discourse that will be more conducive for the facilitation of cooperation and amicable relations between China and India when it comes to their involvement in Nepal in particular and in South Asia in general.

## References

- Alford, J. 1984. Security Dilemmas of Small States. *The World Today*, 40 (8/9), 363-369.
- Amstrup, N. 1976. The Perennial Problem of Small States: A Survey of Research Efforts. *Cooperation and Conflict*, XI, 163-182.
- Anand, J. P. 1977. Nepal's Zone of Peace Concept and China. *China Report*, 6-10.
- Archer, C., Bailes, A. J., and Wivel, A. 2014. *Small States and International Security: Europe and Beyond*. New York: Routledge.
- Azar, E. E. 1973. *Probe for Peace: Small State Hostilities*. Burgess Pub. Co.
- Baehr, P. R. 1975. Small States: A Tool for Analysis. *World Politics*, 27(3), 456-466.
- Banerjee, S. 2002. Nepal: New Flashpoint. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 37(36), 3715-3716.
- Baral, L. R. 1992. India-Nepal Relations: Continuity and Change. *Asian Survey*, 32(9), 815-829.
- Baral, L. S. 1981. Nepal and Non-alignment. *International Studies*, 20(1-2), 257-272.
- Bista, B. P. 2012. Nepal's Foreign Policy Challenges. *Emerging Challenges of Nepal's Foreign Policy* (pp. 23-39). Kathmandu: Institute of Foreign Affairs.
- Braveboy-Wagner, J. A. 2008. *Small States in Global Affairs: The Foreign Policies of the Caribbean Community (Caricom)*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Brown, M. 1971. The Diplomatic Development of Nepal. *Asian Survey*, 11(7), 661-676.
- Budhraj, B. S. 1966. Non-alignment-- Faith or Policy? *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, 27(3/4), 48-56.
- Bull, H. 1977. *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Chaturvedy, R. R., and Malone, D. M. 2012. A Yam Between Two Boulders: Nepal's Foreign Policy Caught between India and China. In S. v. Einsiedel, D. M. Malone, & S. Pradhan, *Nepal in Transition: From People's War to Fragile Peace* (pp. 287-312). New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Chicago Tribune. 1949. 31st Red Veto Bars Nepal as Member of UN. p. 7.
- Dabhade, M., & Pant, H. V. 2004. Coping with Challenges to Sovereignty: Sino-Indian Rivalry and Nepal's Foreign Policy. *Contemporary South Asia*, 13(2), 157-169.
- Dahal, D. R. 2011. The Art of Survival: Policy Choices for Nepal. *Dhaulagiri Journal of Sociology and Anthropology*, 5(31).
- Dai, S.-Y. 1963. Peking, Katmandu and New Delhi. *The China Quarterly*, 16, 86-98 .
- Datta-Ray, S. K. 1984. *Smash and Grab: Annexation of Sikkim*. India: Vikas Publishing House.
- Duval, R. D., & Thompson, W. R. 1980. Reconsidering the Aggregate Relationship between Size, Economic Development, and Some Types of Foreign Policy Behavior. *American Journal of Political Science*, 24(3), 511-525.
- East, M. A. 1975. Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two Models. In C. W. Kegley, *International Events and the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Evans, G., & Newnham, R. 1999. *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations*. London: Penguin Books.
- Fazal, T. M. 2007. *State Death: The Politics of Geography of Conquest, Occupation and Annexation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Feer, M. C. 1953. India's Himalayan Frontier. *Far Eastern Survey*, 22(11), 137-141.
- Fox, A. B. 1969. The Small States in International System 1919-1969. *International Journal*, 24(4), 751-764.
- Fox, A. B. 1965. The Small States of Western Europe in the United Nations. *International Organization*, 19(3), 774-786.
- Gartner, H. 2001. Small States and Alliances. In E. Reiter, and H. Gartner, *Small States and Alliances* (pp. 1-10). Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
- Gvalia, G., Siroky, D., Lebanidze, B., & Iashvili, Z. 2013. Thinking Outside the Bloc: Explaining the Foreign Policies of Small States. *Security Studies*, 22, 98-131.
- Hey, J. A. 2003. *Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior*. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publisher.

- Jesse, N. G., & Dreyer, J. R. 2016. *Small States in The International System: At Peace and at War*. London: Lexington Books.
- Jesse, N. G., Lobell, S. E., Press-Barnathan, G., & Williams, K. P. 2012. The Leaders can't Lead When the Followers won't Follow: The Limitations of Hegemon. In N. G. Jesse, S. E. Lobell, & K. P. Williams, *Beyond Great Powers and Hegemons: Why Secondary States Support, Follow or Challenge* (pp. 1-32). California: Stanford University Press.
- Kassab, H. S. 2015. *Weak States in International Relations Theory: The Cases of Armenia, St. Kitts and Nevis, Lebanon, and Cambodia*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Keohane, R. O. 1969. Lilliputian's Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics. *International Organization*, 23(2), pp.291-310.
- Khatri, S. 2012. Foreign Policy in the Changed Context of Nepal. *A Report on Emerging Challenges of Nepal's Foreign Policy* (pp. 71-91). Kathmandu: Institute of Foreign Affair.
- Koirala, N. 1990. Nepal in 1989: A Very Difficult Year. *Asian Survey*, 30(2), 136-143.
- Larsen, H. 2005) *Analysing the Foreign Policy of Small States in EU: The Case of Denmark*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Levi, W. 1956. Politics in Nepal. *Far Eastern Survey*, 25(3), 39-46.
- Levi, W. 1957. Nepal in World Politics. *Pacific Affairs*, 30(3), 236-248.
- Lewis, P. 2007. Bringing Small States Back In: The Caribbean and Pacific in a New World Order. *Social and Economic Studies*, 56(1/2), 1-31.
- Long, T. 2016. Small States, Great Power? Gaining Influence Through Intrinsic, Derivative and Collective Power. *International Studies Review*, 0, 1-21.
- Long, T. 2017. It's not the Size, It's the Relationship: from 'Small States' to Asymmetry. *International Politics*, 54, 144-160.
- Maass, M. 2009. The Elusive Definition of the Small State. *International Politics*, 46(1), 65-83.
- Mage, J. 2007. The Nepali Revolution and International Relations. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 42(20), 1834-1839.
- Maniruzzaman, T. 1982. *The Security of Small States in the Third World*. Canberra: Australian National University Press.

- Mehra, P. 1994. Managing India's Nepal Policy: the Raj and After. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 29(15), 849-852.
- Mishra, R. 2004. India's Role in Nepal's Maoist Insurgency. *Asian Survey*, 44(5), 627-646.
- Muni, S. D. 2016. *Foreign Policy of Nepal*. New Delhi: Adroit Publishers.
- Olafsson, B. G. 1998. *Small States in the Global System: Analysis and Illustrations from the Case of Iceland*. London: Routledge.
- Pandey, S. R. 2009. *Nepalese Foreign Policy at Crossroads*. Kathmandu: Sangam Institute.
- Reiter, E., & Gartner, H. 2001. *Small States and Alliances*. Berlin: Springer.
- Rogers, J. 2007. Foreign Policy of Small States: Sweden and the Mosul Crisis. *Contemporary European History*, 16(3), 349-369.
- Rose, L. E. 1971. *Nepal: Strategy For Survival*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Rothstein, R. 1968. *Alliances and Small Powers*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Scholz, J. T. 1977. Nepal in 1976: Problems with India Threaten Birendra's New Order. *Asian Survey*, 17(2), 201-207.
- Shah, S. 2004. A Himalayan Red Herring: Maoist Revolution in the Shadow of the Legacy Raj. In M. Hutt, *Himalayan People's War: Nepal's Maoist Rebellion* (pp. 192-224). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Sharma, U. K. 2004. The Peace Zone Concept and Its Utility in Nepalese Foreign Policy. *Journal of Political Science*, VII, 44-50.
- Singer, M. R. 1972. *Weak States in a World of Powers: The Dynamics of International Relationships*. Free Press.
- Stiller, L. F. 2017. *The Rise of the House of Gorkha*. Kathmandu: Education Publishing House.
- Strassler, R. B. 1996. *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to The Peloponnesian War*. New York: Free Press.
- Subedi, S. P. 1994. India-Nepal Security Relations and the 1950 Treaty: Times for New Perspective. *Asian Survey*, 34(3), 273-284.

- Thorhallsson, B., and Bailes, A. J. 2016. Small State Diplomacy. In C. M. Constantinou, P. Kerr, & P. Sharp, *The Sage Handbook of Diplomacy* (pp. 294-207). London: Sage.
- Thurer, D. 1998. The Perception of Small States: Myth and Reality. In L. Goetschel, *Small States inside and outside the European Union: Interests and Policies* (pp. 33-42). Boston: Springer.
- Upadhyaya, S. 2012. *Nepal and the Geo-Strategic Rivalry between China and India*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Vaidya, T. 2000. The Kot Massacre: A Critical Assessment. *Voice of History*, 15(1), pp. 1-18.
- Vaidya, T., and Bajracharya, B. 1996. *Nepal: International Perspectives*. New Delhi: Anmol Publications.
- Vandenbosch, A. 1964. The Small States in International Politics and Organization. *The Journal of Politics*, 26(2), 293-321.
- Vital, D. 1967. *The Inequality of States*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Waltz, K. N. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. Massachusetts: Addison Wesley.
- Watson, A. 1992. *The Evolution of International Society*. London: Routledge.
- Whelpton, J. 2005. *A History of Nepal*. Delhi: Cambridge University Press.
- Whelpton, J. 2013. Political Violence in Nepal from Unification to Janandolan I: The Background to 'People's War'. In M. Lecomte-Tilouine, *Revolution in Nepal: An Anthropological and Historical approach to the People's War* (pp. 27-74). New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Wiberg, H. 1987. The Security of Small Nations: Challenges and Defences. *Journal of Peace Research*, 24(4), 339-363.
- World Bank. 2016. *The World Bank Data*. Retrieved September 14, 2017, from <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=NP>