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## **Strategic Military Tactics in Kautilya's Arthashastra: An Analytical Study**

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### **Abstract**

*Strategic military tactics are the intentional and coordinated moves and strategies used by military forces to accomplish specific political or military goals. This work analyzes the sophisticated military doctrines in Kautilya's Arthashastra, highlighting their strategic relevance in both historical and modern contexts. The article provides a comprehensive qualitative analysis of the strategic military tactics detailed in Kautilya's Arthashastra, an essential text on ancient Indian statecraft and warfare. Utilizing a qualitative content analysis method, the study closely examines Kautilya's military doctrines, focusing on strategic and tactical maneuvers designed to achieve political goals. It delves into Kautilya's classifications of war, open and deceptive battle tactics, foreign policy measures, defense strategies, army organization, and battle formations. By exploring Kautilya's perspectives on war and governance, the paper highlights the profound insights of Eastern philosophy in the areas of foreign policy and statecraft. It emphasizes the continuing relevance of Kautilya's strategic military concepts in contemporary settings, showcasing the sophistication of Eastern*

*thought on warfare, conflict, and national interests. The study concludes that Kautilya's Arthashastra remains a timeless masterpiece of military strategy and statecraft, offering enduring lessons for modern policymakers and military strategists.*

**Keywords:** Arthashastra, intelligence, Kautilya, oriental philosophy, strategy, Sadgunya Neeti

## Introduction

Kautilya's Arthashastra, composed in antiquity, is regarded as one of the earliest and most comprehensive works on political realism and statecraft. Despite being written over two millennia ago, this ancient Indian treatise continues to offer profound insights into the realms of foreign policy, military strategy, and governance.

The Arthashastra, rediscovered in 1904 by Dr. R. Shamasastri, has made a remarkable comeback in modern times. The verses in the article, in curly brackets {}, are the original translations from Dr. Shamasastri himself.

The writings of oriental scholars, particularly Kautilya (370–283 BC) and Sun Tzu (554–496 BC), have significantly contributed to our understanding of various aspects of warfare, including offensive strategy, the importance of dispositions, assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the opponent, the influence of weather and terrain, and the use of secret agents.

The implicit problem statement of this study is to showcase the depth and relevance of Eastern philosophy, particularly Kautilya's ideas on statecraft and military strategy from the ancient treatise Arthashastra, in the context of contemporary foreign policy and warfare.

The paper focuses on examining the military knowledge and tactical concepts inherent in the Arthashastra to highlight the sophistication of Eastern thought on matters of war, conflict, and national interests. By closely analyzing Kautilya's classifications of war, open and deceptive battle tactics, foreign policy measures, defense strategies, army structure, and battle formations, the article aims to underscore the enduring significance of this ancient Indian work in modern times.

## **Objective of the Study**

The primary objective of this research is to highlight profound depth of Eastern philosophy within the domains of foreign policy and statecraft. This is accomplished by meticulously examining the military knowledge embedded in the ancient text Arthashastra. This study aims to elucidate Kautilya's strategic insights on warfare. It includes the classification of various types of war. It encompasses both open and deceptive battle tactics. Additionally, it explores foreign policy measures. It also delves into defense strategies, army organization and battle formations. Through an in-depth analysis of Kautilya's teachings this paper seeks to demonstrate the enduring relevance and significance of his strategic military doctrines in contemporary contexts.

## **Method**

This article offers a qualitative content analysis approach and interpretation of the military knowledge and strategic concepts outlined in the ancient Indian treatise, the Arthashastra. Key ideas from the primary source text are closely examined. They are studied and synthesized to provide a comprehensive understanding of Kautilya's contributions to military strategy and statecraft.

## **Literature Review**

Arthashastra is the masterwork of India's greatest statesman-philosopher, minister in the Kingdom of Chandragupta Maurya during 317-293 BC, Kautilya (Chandrasekaran, 2006). His other seminal treatise Chanakya Neeti imparts knowledge on every practical aspect of life (Chaturvedi, 2006). Composed in the late fourth century BCE, Arthashastra ranks alongside Sun Tzu's Art of War and Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War as one of the timeless classics of the ancient arts of war and governance. Like Art of War, the origins of Arthashastra are somewhat shrouded in mystery (Boesche, 2003a).

India faces contemporary military challenges requiring nuanced reforms that sometimes depart from Kautilya's ideals. While his teachings remain relevant, the dynamic geopolitical landscape demands flexible, innovative defense strategies (Dutta, Dutta, & Bhuyan, 2023).

To understand the Indian strategic culture, one must understand Kautilya's Arthashastra. Contemporary Indian national security preferences show a parallel resonance to the teachings of Kautilya's Arthashastra. However, the existence of national security variable in Arthashastra has been undermined by most of the researches (Saad & Wenxiang, 2020).

Kautilya's foreign policy reveals logical analysis of all aspects of relations between states (Vittal, 2011). Modern security issues necessitate specialized solutions beyond classical ideas. Embracing novel concepts, especially in intelligence gathering and advanced technologies like AI, cyberwarfare, and space capabilities, is crucial. Strengthening espionage capabilities and integrating cutting-edge technologies while upholding core security principles will enhance India's ability to address current and the future threats effectively (Dutta, Dutta, & Bhuyan, 2023).

Kautilya's insights remain pertinent in contemporary discussions as states address intricate geopolitical challenges. Policymakers balance self-interest with collective security. Policymakers facing evolving threats in globally interconnected environment find Kautilya's enduring wisdom to be valuable guide. It provides lessons on the persistent quest for national security. This is in a constantly shifting global context (Ghimire & Lamichhane, 2024).

## **Findings and Discussions**

### **Types of war**

The Arthasāstra extensively discusses various aspects of governmental administration, with a particular focus on war, its preparation, and successful execution. There are four types of war stated. Mantrayuddha, 'war by counsel', is the

exercise of diplomacy. When the ruler is in a weaker position and decides it would be unwise to fight, he will use this kind of approach. Prakasayuddha is an open warfare with a set time and location. "Kutayuddha is concealed warfare and refers primarily to upajapa, psychological warfare including instigation of treachery in the enemy camp" (Rangrajan, 1992). Gudayuddha, or clandestine war, is fought covertly and without engaging in actual combat, typically by assassinating the adversary. Another classification of war, as envisioned by Kautilya and Ashoka and occasionally referenced in the epics and the Puranas, includes Dharmavijaya, Asuravijaya, and Lobhavijaya (Bailey, 2022).

### **Open and deceptive battles**

Kautilya thought there was a "science" of warfare, presumably part of a larger science of politics (Boesche, 2003b).

In order to be strictly in accordance with dharma the place and time of battle must be specified beforehand. {10.3.26}

When a king's army is stronger, his infiltrations into the enemy camp have been effective, all safety precautions have been taken, and the terrain is favorable for him, it is proposed that he engage in a proclaimed or open battle.

The king is suggested utilize the methods of deception if the aforementioned requirements are not met. Kautilya argues that when the enemy's forces are suffering from a disaster, they are exposed, and they are on less favorable terrain than the attacker, they must be attacked.


Kautilya also offers other deceptive strategies, such as getting the opponent's forces weary by fighting with foreign, or jungle troops and then attacking with one's own fresh men; luring enemy warriors into an ambush by luring them with livestock or wild animals. Verses {10.3.14–23, 25} also discuss more deception strategies, such as keeping the enemy's warriors awake at night and then attacking them during the day when they are drowsy or asleep. For instance, Kautilya explored methods of employing poison but strategically advised its use against key adversary figures. He

recommended that while offering untainted wine to military leaders, agents should provide them with wine laced with poison when they were intoxicated (Sheikh & Rashid, 2020).

### Sadgunya Neeti

Sadgunya is the six measures or derivative of upayaya in the field of foreign policy. It includes Vighraha (war), Dvaidhibhava (dual policy), Yana (preparing for the war), Asana (neutral), Samshraya (seeking protection), and Sandhi (making peace) (Kumar, 2021). Figure 1 depicts the spectrum of Sadgunya Neeti.

Fig. 1: *Spectrum of Sadgunya Neeti*



### Defense

The frontier outposts and four different kinds of forts—mountain, river, jungle, and desert located throughout the nation are the means of a physical defense system, according to Kautilya. At the same time, the avoidance of treachery, revolts, and rebellions was just as important as the actual physical defense of the country.

Only the necessary number of troops were maintained for defense during peacetime, and extra troops were formed for conquest using 'the money saved from demobilization', a line item in the accounting of government revenue and expenditure, according to {2.6.21, 2.15.10}. These were primarily the forces in charge of protecting the forts and the royal property, according to {5.3.26}. Although

they were in permanent service, the officers in charge of such troops sometimes underwent transfers. The king's Own Guards, also known as the *antarvamsikasainya*, was a unique form of army that was never disbanded. The monarch is urged to scatter the demobilized forces within his own territory rather than an ally's, so that the army may be quickly gathered back together.

### **Intelligence**

The monarch used a number of techniques to keep his army under his control. The army's leaders were highly compensated so they could afford to pay their soldiers handsomely and not be lured by the temptations of the enemy {5.3.24-26}. Their moral character was examined, especially to pick out cowards {1.10.9-12}.

“They were kept under constant surveillance through clandestine agents, especially to see that they not succumb to the instigations of the enemy. For some reason, each of the four wings of the army were placed under the control of more than one chief, so that mutual suspicion and fear would ensure their loyalty.” (Rangrajan, 1992, p. 676 )

Also, those who were thought to be traitors were sent to isolated places while their families were held captive in the capital. They were occasionally covertly killed off.

### **Operations**

The supplies for the men, horses, and elephants seem to have been distributed based on “work months.” The “work month” was defined as 32 days for infantry, 35 days for horses, and 40 days for elephants. “The responsibility for payment of rations and wages rested with the battalion commander, in charge of a hundred units and the divisional commander in charge of a thousand units” {5. 3 .25} (Rangrajan, 1992, p. 677).

Verses {5.3.42-44} state that when an army was needed for a campaign, the king used his own agents, who pretended to be traders, to sell crown goods on

credit; the soldiers were then given the commodities for the support of their families while they were away, and the double price of the goods was collected from them when they returned from the expedition. Thus, the monarch was able to get rid of his supplies while also making a profit greater than their original cost.

### **Structure of the army**

The army, mentioned in Arthashastra, follow the traditional Indian structure of four wings: elephants, chariots, horses, and infantry.

Six-foot soldiers encircled each warrior on horseback in battle, and five horse units surrounded elephants and chariots. For hand-to-hand battle, the infantry included troops armed with swords, spears, and lances as well as archers.

Various sections of the text also discuss provisions for the trench and water warriors.

The detailed classification of the troops into the standing army, territorial army, militias, foreign forces, and tribal forces is stated in {9.2.14–19}.


The organizational structure of the army and the responsibilities of each department's chief, whether they are military or civil, are described in various verses of the book.

### **Types of troops**

Kautilya has used an expression *maula-bhrita-sreni-mitra-amitra-atavi* {2.33.8} to define the types of troops. The king's own country's troops are referred to as *maula*. Similarly *bhrita* are the territorial subjects while *sreni* is the guild. The friendly troop is termed as *mitra* while *amitra* refers to an inimical, therefore an alien, troop. A jungle unit led by its own chief is referred to as an *atavi*, the ultimate sort of troop commanded by their own chief.



Fig. 2: Organizational structure of the army




### The base camp

“The base camp was a fortified area set up near the war zone, far away from the capital of the conqueror. The base camp, being a semi-permanent establishment, resembled the town plan of the capital city, with fortifications such as a moat, towers, ramparts, parapets and gates” {10.1. 1} (Rangrajan, 1992, p. 704) as shown in Figure 3.

Similar to the city, the camp was separated into parts by roads, with the king in the innermost sector and his personal bodyguards. There were five overlapping zones created within the camp. Each following sector, starting from the center, was occupied by troops and bureaucrats of lower status. The audience room, the treasury,

the command post (from which commands were given), the king's private elephant, horse, and chariot were all located in the area closest to the king's chambers. The purohita (spiritual advisor), the armoury, the warehouses, and the counselors were located in the following circle. The following circle contained the more dependable forces, namely the standing army and the Territorial Army, as well as the Chief of Defence, horses, and chariots. Next were militias, elephants, and the camp director. The labor corps and allied, alien, and jungle forces were positioned on the outermost circle. Alongside the major highways were positioned merchants and courtesans. Outside the border, where the outcast assistants like dog handlers and hunters were stationed, traps were set up with fire and drums as warning devices. Outside, there were sentinels and secret agents as well.

Fig. 3: *The Base camp, from L.N. Rangarajan, 1992.*



## **Qualifications and Responsibilities of the Chief of Defense**

The Chief of Defense must be an expert with all types of combat weaponry, well-known for his skills on horses, elephants, and chariots, and knowledgeable about the relative strengths of the four wings of the army and how to use them in combat. He will be in charge of upholding order in the armed forces, designating distinctive identities for each formation, and making distinctions between them.

## **Strategies and tactics of the Chief of Defense**

The best time to embark on an offensive expedition, the best terrain, and the best time of year to engage in combat should all be chosen. He should also decide how to deploy his own forces, plan how to disperse the enemy's forces, put his own broken arrays back together, plan how to disperse the enemy's close order formations, plan how to destroy the enemy's dispersed forces, and besiege and destroy enemy forts. {2.33.10, 11}.

Kautilya presented an exhaustive delineation of the responsibilities, prerequisites, and commitments expected of the principal commanders, along with the ramifications attendant upon their failure to fulfill them.

## **Preparations for the battle**

“The conqueror shall collect his forces together and say to them: ‘I am as much a servant [of the State] as you are; we shall share the wealth of this state. Attack these, mine enemies’” {10.3.27} (Rangrajan, 1992). Along with the king, counsellors, astrologers and purohitas were asked to motivate the troops.

Verses {10.3.34-37} in Arthashastra guide that the night before the fight, the monarch must observe a fast and spend the night close to his chariot and weapons. He is required to offer sacrifices in the fire in accordance with the Atharva Veda. He will have prayers offered for military success and for those who perish to reach heaven. He will put his trust in Brahmins.

### Base camp to battle ground

“The march of the army from the base camp to the battle ground, shall be determined taking into account the rate of march, the programme of extended stay, short stay and marching and the ability of villages and forests on the way to supply fodder, fuel and water. Twice the amount of food and equipment needed shall be carried. If this is not possible, the troops shall themselves transport it or it may be stored beforehand at intervals along the route” {10.2.13} (Rangrajan, 1992).

Kautilya argues that “... those who fight from suitable terrain will be superior in battle to those who fight from unsuitable terrain” {10.2.10, 11}.

The commander will march in front, followed by the king and women in the middle, horses and bodyguards on either side, elephants and reinforcements at the very end, and finally the Chief of Defence. The order of camp will remain the same.

### Depending on the circumstances different types of march arrays are designed.

Table 1: *Suggested march arrays for different circumstances*

If the attack is anticipated	March array design	Description
In the front	Makara	Crocodile
In the rear	Sakata	Cart
On the two flanks	vajra	Thunder-bolt
On all sides	sarvato badra	Uniformly circular
If the path is narrow permitting only single file	suchi	Needle

*Source: Rangarajan, 1987, pp. 708-709.*

“In case of any obstruction, the army should march in crocodile array in the front, in cart-like array behind, and on the sides in diamond-like array (i.e., in four or five rows, each having its front, rear and sides) and in a compact array on all sides. When the army is marching on a path passable by a single man, it should march in pin-like array. When peace is made with one and war is to be waged with another, steps should be taken to protect the friends who are bringing help against enemies, such as an enemy in the rear, his ally, a madhyama king, or a neutral king. Roads with obstructions should be examined and cleared. Finance, the army, the strength of the armies of friends, enemies, and wild tribes, the prospect of rains, and the seasons should be thoroughly examined” (Shamasastri, 1915).

One yojana (15 km) a day is the slowest speed of marching. The best rate of march is two yojanas each day, with one and a half yojanas being average. Depending on the situation, the rate may change. Provisions for clearing the obstacles or protecting the army, discussed in detail, are found in the verses {10.2.17-19}.

### **The day of battle**

Verses {10.3.38 and 42} state that the center of the army should be occupied by brave, skilled, noble-born, loyal troops who are not dissatisfied with the money and honors heaped upon them. The monarch will stand in their midst, devoid of flags and identifying characteristics, surrounded by his warrior kinsmen (paternal relatives, brothers, and sons). He will typically ride a chariot, an elephant, and be protected by cavalry. However, he is free to ride whatever is more common in his army or in which he is skilled. A double shall impersonate the king at the head of the battle formation.

Verses {10.3.45 and 46} direct that a hundred thousand panas for killing the enemy king, fifty thousand for a prince or the Army Chief, ten thousand for a division chief, five thousand for an elephant or chariot warrior, thousand for a horse, one hundred for an infantry section leader, twenty for a soldier, as well as double normal wages and whatever booty they seize, are some of the rewards that the Chief

of Defence will announce to make the troops happy with wealth and honors. The divisional, company, and battalion commanders must be informed of these prizes.

### Battle arrays and formations

Kautilya provides a thorough explanation of how to set up the forces for a set-piece fight, beginning with the placement of reinforcements made up of the best soldiers around a kilometer behind the area of combat.

### Basic Units

The explanation begins by identifying a fundamental ‘unit’ for the cavalry (horse-mounted warriors), elephants, and chariots. These never fought by alone. Figure 3 depicts a warrior riding a horse with six warriors by his side as mentioned in {10.5.9-11}. Figure 4 depicts the chariot unit and the elephant unit, both of which had five cavalry units surrounding them as Kautilya has mentioned in verses {9.7.5 and 6} of Arthashastra.

Fig. 4: Basic Unit for Cavalry from L.N. Rangarajan, 1992.





Fig. 5: Basic Unit for Elephants and Chariots




### Close and open orders

The forces could be arranged in a more open or more widely spaced arrangement. The decision was undoubtedly influenced by the terrain's characteristics, the type of forces at hand, and the enemy's force posture. The distance between troops in a row in the infantry's 'close order', who were armed solely with swords, spears, or lances, was only 26.5 cm, likely measured with their arms extended. The

arrangement of the archers was more open, with 225 cm between each pair in a row. The minimal distance between two soldiers is simply an estimate; it might be doubled or tripled. The soldiers shouldn't ever be crammed too closely together that it hinders their capacity to fight. Figure 5 explains the infantry placement mentioned in verses {10.5.3.6 and 7}.

Fig. 6: *Infantry Placement*




The distance between the horses, elephants, and chariots was multiplied by three for cavalry and five for elephants and chariots as explained in Figure 6.

**Arrays**

Arrays were created from these “basic units”. Elephants and chariots had identical arrays, with nine being the minimum number for an array. These arrays were set up in three rows of three each, as seen in Figure 7.




Fig. 7: *Placement for cavalry units in an array*



The minimal array consisted of nine chariots, forty-five mounted warriors, and two hundred- and seventy-foot soldiers because each chariot was supported by five cavalry units, each with one mounted warrior and six foot soldiers.

“The number of chariots in each row could be increased by two, up to 21 in each row; the number of rows was always three. Thus, an array could consist of 9, 15, 21, 27, 33, 39, 45, 51, 57 or 63 chariots” (Rangrajan, 1992).


Fig. 8: *Placement of elephant and chariot units in an array*



### Formations

One array was placed in the center, two in the flanks, and two in the wings, and the distance between the arrays was five dhanus, or 11.25 meters as illustrated in Figure 8.


Fig. 9: *Battle formation*



The term “balanced”, see fig. 9, refers to a structure in which all five arrays are the same size as mentioned in verses {10.5.12-14}. Another hypothesis is that, in comparison to the central array, the arrays on the wings and flanks may have two extra chariots (or elephants). These forms are referred to as “unbalanced” (fig. 10) as mentioned in verses {10.5.17-19}.

In each of the conceivable balanced and unbalanced formation combinations, there are ten chariots (or elephants), horses, and warriors. There were 315 chariots, 1575 mounted warriors, and about 10,000 foot soldiers in the greatest arrangement, which included 21 chariots in each row of each array.

Fig. 10: *Minimum balanced battle formation*



### **Surpluses and strengthening**

Some forces might still be available after building the units and arrays with the previously allocated forces. There are guidelines for how to distribute them to reinforce the wings, sides, and center.


### **Pure and mixed formations**

One type of force can be used to create a battle configuration consisting of a center, two flanks, and two wings: either foot soldiers, cavalry forces, or chariot or elephant units. These are defined as ‘Pure’ formations.

More than one type of force made up a “mixed” formation. All four wings as well as horse units, elephants, and chariots could be utilized. Additionally, the deployment of forces in mixed formations is described.

### Modes of attack

Fig. 11: Unbalanced 5/7 formation



In military strategy, a conqueror should adopt specific tactical formations to effectively counter various enemy arrays. For instance, the pradara formation should be attacked using the dridhaka formation, while the dridhaka can be countered with the asahya formation. The syena (eagle-like array) is best opposed with the chápa (bow-shaped array). A fortified position should be met with an even stronger fortification. The sanjaya formation can be successfully assailed by the vijaya formation, sthúlakarna by visálavijaya, and váripantaka by sarvatobhadra. Furthermore, the durjaya formation is recommended as a universal counter to all types of enemy formations (Shamasastri, 1915).

An opposing force could be attacked in a number of ways by the various arrays in a formation. There are four fundamental types: a snake, a circle, a straight line, and dispersed. The center, flanks, and wings advanced uniformly in a straight

line or “truncheon,” unevenly in a sinuous snake shape, in a circle, radiating outward, and independently of one another in a dispersed formation.

A list of the subtypes of the “basic four” is provided by Kautilya. There are thirty two sub-types in total, including the fundamental type, eighteen under “the truncheon,” four under “the snake,” three under “the circle,” and seven under “the dispersed.” There are indications that one of the wings or the flank may have moved forward or backward in a different way.

### **The attack**

Kautilya states in {10.5.58}, “The conqueror must have reinforcements in the rear before attacking since they are crucial for restoring disorganized lines. He personally will remain about 360 meters behind the main troops with the reinforcements.”

He further explains in verses {10.5.48-52}, the opponent will be attacked with one or two of the groups in the array, the center, the wings, or the flanks, after the fighting formation has been set up. The remaining portion should be held in reserve for assisting the attack.

The portion of the enemy forces with weak units, no elephants or horses, untrustworthy troops, or who have already been seduced will be attacked by a big portion of the best troops. When the enemy’s army is at its largest, twice as many of the best troops must be used in the attack. Wherever the opposing forces are vulnerable or where there is a threat of defeat or counterattack, reinforcements should be sent in to help.

“Infantry shall be attacked by horses; horses by chariots and chariots by elephants. An enemy force weak in one constituent shall be attacked by a stronger force [of the same constituent]” {10.6.44}.

The conqueror will use a variety of tactics to terrorize the enemy forces during the battle, including the use of machinery, occult practices, assassinating people who

are busy working witchcraft, proclaiming the conqueror's affiliation with the gods, scaring people with carts, elephants, or herds of cattle, inciting traitors, setting fire to the enemy camp, and killing the end and the rear [supporters and camp followers]. The distribution of false information, such as the burning or capture of an enemy fort, a relative's uprising, or the insurrection of a jungle chief in his domain, by agents acting as messengers can also cause panic. {10.6.48-50}

### **Post battle**

Following the destruction of the enemy army, the king is advised to: (i) if the enemy force was stronger, sue for peace; (ii) accept peace if it is requested by a foe with equal power; and (iii) unless the opponent has entered [the shelter of] his own land or is prepared to give his life, eliminate an inferior power enemy.

“The fury of a desperate king returning to battle with no thought for his own life is irresistible; therefore, a routed army shall not be further harassed to the extent of provoking it to fight until annihilation” {10.3.54-57} (Rangrajan, 1992).

## **Conclusion**

In conclusion Kautilya's Arthashastra stands as seminal treatise on statecraft. It encompasses a wide array of topics. These range from political economy to military strategy. The text's profound insights into warfare underscore its enduring relevance. This is crucial in the study of military tactics and international relations. Kautilya's classification of warfare into four distinct types, Mantrayuddha, Prakasayuddha, Kutayuddha and Gudayuddha, demonstrates a sophisticated understanding. This is about the multifaceted nature of conflict. It also shows the necessity for adaptable strategies. His advocacy for open warfare under favorable conditions coupled with the strategic use of deception when required highlights a pragmatic approach to military engagements.

The Sadgunya Neeti which delineates six foreign policy measures, provides comprehensive framework for diplomatic and military interactions. It emphasizes

the importance of context. Decisions between conflict alliance, and neutrality must be carefully considered. The detailed organization of the army including elephants, chariots horses and infantry, illustrates advanced military planning. It highlights the significance of a well-structured force. The classification of troops based on origin and allegiance further emphasizes this point.

Kautilya's recommendations for post-battle scenarios reveal his strategic acumen. He advocates for peace when faced with a stronger adversary. He encourages conquest when the opportunity for dominance arises. This pragmatic and flexible approach underscores the Arthashastra's contribution to the understanding of realpolitik. It sheds light on the dynamics of power.

The comprehensive nature of Kautilya's military strategies ranges from detailed battle formations to nuanced foreign policy advice. This underscores the Arthashastra's value. It is foundational text in political and military theory. Its principles continue to offer relevant insights. It is a crucial resource for scholars and practitioners in military strategy political science and international relations

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