

NEPAL'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE ERSTWHILE VIETNAM CRISIS

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Background :

The Indo-Chinese area had acquired, after World War II, a significant and important geo-strategical place in the international politics and foreign policy assessment of a nation. Because its involvement into crises often of major consequences had affected the international political milieu and its process. A nation could not remain in an isolated stage without expressing its feelings on problems relating to the conflicts in which the regional countries were often involved. The conflicts had usually affected their own survival and existence and drawn the Big Powers and peripheral powers into these conflicts. The presence and involvement of the foreign powers had also influenced their internal political environment, which in turn had projected its weight on the trends of international politics. The conflicts of the region had for many decades imparted a major repercussion on the peace and security of the area and world as whole.

Its geo-politico-strategical conditions and independence struggle had drawn the attention of the intrusive powers to intermingle in the local politics to preserve their interests: first France intended to secure and preserve its colonies, secondly, the US tried to control and check the threat of international communism and thirdly, the USSR attempted to consolidate its position there after the region adopted communist way of life with the help of Vietnam. So this area, which is part of the South East Asian region, had strategically been dominating the interactions among local powers and other powers on matters relating policies, strategies, and actions towards political conditions and conflicts. The Asian small nations like Nepal did also kept its track on the matters concerning the area's security and peace, and political trends that had been influencing the international politics. Being a Asian nation it has likely that It "must be affected more by what happen there than the non-Asian ..."¹

Within this political reality and situation in the regional sub-system* it has to encounter three regional challenges: (a) internal power relations, in which Vietnam had been ideologically predominant and

had its position felt upon other powers Laos and Kampuchea, recently, Vietnam emerged as powerful local leader and some extent had been shaping the political courses : (b) the split in the integrated world communist movement and increasing tendency among the leaders of the divided groups-China and USSR to increase their sphere of influence over the newly emerged Asian communist states through their client forces had posed a serious challenge to region political milieu, though they had earlier supported and extend help to Vietnam in its struggle to liberate the country from the colonial and US interventions : (c) the existence of a complete anti-communist forces and their integrated move to meet the growing communist menace through ASEAN had also posed a problem or challenge to the regional politics. The ASEAN powers had expressed their serious concern at the events in which Vietnam had been actively involved with the back of the USSR who had differences with China. Finally, the US, who had previously been deeply involved in the sub-system's politics, also kept its vigil over the emerging trends there and co-operated with China and ASEAN to check the Soviet presence and Vietnamese dominating role. Under these challenges the regional sub-system's political environment operates affecting the course of global politics.

Thus, in Indo-China the core actors Vietnam, Kampuchea, and Laos, the intrusive and peripheral powers: the US, the USSR, China, and ASEAN had played an effective role in the political events that had taken place in the recent past. Others powers like Nepal, India, Bangladesh and Pakistan being members of the Asian community and non-aligned movement had perceived and expressed their views differently on the changing scenario of politics due to crises which had foreign powers influence and domination.²

The Indo-Chinese peoples with the memories of the past political heritage and glories, traditional cultures, and recent struggle to free the nations from the colonial rule and domination had shown their zeal and courage to fight any eventualities that might come across to them. Although, these three countries had different cultural heritages, they had projected their nationalism and courage to protect the people's cause through mass upsurge to free the country from foreign clutches under the leadership of Ho Chi Minn, Nordom Shhanouk, Souvana Phuma and Souphavong. Nepal, who was keenly watching the struggle for independence, appreciated and supported it. It could not remain different from the political realities that was prevailing there during 1950s to 1975. Its expression of perceptions and views on the crises, in which the region was involved here, based on the principles of non-aligned policy. The policy towards Indo-China was mainly guided by its

national interest, small nation character, geo-strategical and political/ settings of the area, and the Big Powers policies. Its policy and expression of opinion largely depended on the objective and purposive evaluation of the issues that were involved in them by using the tools of national interest and foreign policy ideology.

The concept of the national interest is used in both political analysis and political action. As an analytical tool, it is employed to describe, explain, or evaluate the source or the adequacy of a nation's foreign policy. As an instrument of political action, it serves as a means of justifying, denouncing or proposing policies... in/other words, refer to what is best for a national society ... Government employ a wide range of tools and technique to gain their ends ... of political interaction and political relations.³

Basing on this precept Nepalese perceptions towards Vietnam crises had been formulated and expressed. His Majesty King Mahendra observed on Vietnam conflict that :

we are much concern over recent development in Vietnam. That Vietnam has continued to divide for so many years is bad enough but intensification of tension in the area as a result of the intrusion of powerful extraneous forces is even worse. Divided Vietnam one day unite ... The way towards the unification peace, and happiness of the Vietnamese people, in our opinion, lies through relaxation and non-intensification of tension.⁴

His Majesty's observation against the intensification of the Vietnamese crisis and its effect on the peace and integration of the country was itself an indication towards the Nepalese awareness and concern for restoration of peace. But, however, this crises torn region could not able to keep or restore peace permanently as it struggled for freedom and independence at two phases : (a) 1940-54, (b) 1960-75, and later involved into internal crisis between Vietnam and Kampuchea. The first phase of struggle ended with the Geneva agreement of 1954. The region saw the emergence of the North and South Vietnams, Laos, and Kampuchea. The Division of Vietnam under two parts became a 'real problem' It created a new crisis as the integration process as provided by the Geneva agreement could not be achieved. The second phase of struggle became more critical, acute and decisive, which only ended with January 24, 1973 Paris Accord. The post Paris accord era saw the unification of Vietnam, consolidation of communist movement in whole of Indo-China and a crisis of major proportion involving Communist Kampuchea and Vietnam which changed the political milieu completely. Nepal had watched these development with interest and hold its own feelings, perceptions and attitudes which might be different

in some context than those pursued by other South Asian nation. Not only the government was much concern about the changing trends there, but people of various shades: elite community, press and student community had expressed their opinions on Vietnam war and Kampuchean issue. In this article an attempt had been made to evaluate the perceptions and feelings of Nepal on these two events, which shaped the destiny of the people of Vietnam.

II

Nepal, with the exposure from isolation into global politics after 1946, shaped its own foreign policy on independent course based on the tenets of the non-aligned concept and the national interests to express its views on the sensitive and important crisis that had plagued the region. It had positively stand for peace, stability, non-interference, and integration. Because it feels that their maintenance are very essential for socio-economic development in any part of the world. But, the world politics or regional politics had witnessed the disturbances in maintaining peace, stability, non-interference and integration of strategic vital areas like Indo-China. It looks as it alongwith other international actor cautiously, because Big Powers had influenced and dominated the area. It considers the policies of these powers as gross interference in the internal affairs of the Indo-Chinese nations and their freedom to choose their destiny. So Nepalese views and evaluation of the crisis are independently assessed one. It had kept a close proximity with the crisis and its environment, which had affected the survival, independence and existence of the small nation and had taken stands according to its policy.

It felt that the incident like the Gulf of Tomkin would not help to restore peace rather it would escalate the conflict⁵ it refused to concur with the view that the force would resolve issues, but rather felt that the principle of peaceful means are to resolve the crisis. King Mahendra had aptly said "We have been always swearing by the ideal of universal peace"⁶. So, it had supported the principle of non-interference. Its views are usually guided by it where foreign intervention had affected peace, harmony and stability. King Birendra had observed that :

... the foreign policy of a country is governed not only by the ideals and standard it sets out to achieve but is dictated as it were, by the need for security and survival ... Nepal had always striven for friendship and harmony.⁷

Thus, its preference to peace, harmony, non-interference, non-use of force to settle the disputes and friendship became chief tools to evaluate and determine its foreign policy operation and expression of views on world crises including Vietnam.

Nepal became one of the ardent supporter of peace, independence, integration and survival of small nations and their freedom struggle. Because these had usually threatened and precipitated the crisis in Indo-China, whose geo-political-strategical conditions had drawn Big Powers involvement at regular intervals. That was why Nepal could not remain indifferent from the fate of these states and voiced its serious concern at the growing tense situation around South East Asia.

Nepal's reactions to Vietnam crisis could be analysed or studied within the political scenario existing in the Indo-China and small nations' sensitive nature and character towards peace, independence, political stability, freedom of action and opposition to foreign interferences. The small nations always favour to the maintenance of peace, so that they could preserve security and integration. Nepal believed in the cardinality of maintenance of world peace through contacts and negotiations. Because "An adventure to peace committed in genuine spirit has always been ... step in the right direction"⁸. So the basic ideology of Nepalese foreign policy had been influenced by "aspiration for peace, for security and for economic development"⁹. Based on these ingredients it had opposed any kind of foreign interference affecting peace, security and integration.

III

There were some form of parallelity in the freedom struggle between Nepal and Vietnam. Nepal struggled to liberate the nation from the autocratic Rana-rule who had served the interest of imperial forces, and succeeded to free the nation from them in 1951 with the help of monarchy. Whereas the people of Vietnam struggled to liberate the region from the colonial forces-France, and only partially succeeded in achieving the target of independence in 1954 through Geneva accord after long drawn bloody revolution. Because divided Vietnam's political trends provided opportunity the Great Powers to involve it into the cold war politics. So desire to have one Vietnam could not be realised, and unity problem proved fatal to the Vietnamese people after defeating France in the battle ground. Thus, in the freedom struggle process Vietnam lacked behind than other and continued its struggle to liberate and unify the two halves, Nepal after liberating from the Rana rule supported Vietnamese people quest for independence and freedom.

Vietnam Crisis

The Vietnam crisis, became more complex and tense; after the Geneva Accord as the relation between North and South Vietnams took conflicting turn due to non-fulfilment of the provisions of the accord. In the South a government with the support of the US emerged whereas

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the north was controlled by the Ho Chi Minh forces, who considered themselves to be true representative of Vietnamese people and followed Marxist line. A politico-ideological line was drawn between North and South. As the tension mounted between the two halves, the chances of unification became difficult. A stage of second phase Vietnam war was gradually laid down. National liberation Front was established with the help of the communist in the South by North Vietnam, on the other hand the US began to support the South Vietnamese Government. The politics of conflict remained there from 1960-73, which threatened the peace and stability of the whole region. As the crisis began to intensify, the Asian countries including Nepal raised its voice at the incidents, e.g. it alongwith Ceylon and Cambodia appealed to the UN Secretary-General U. Thant to approach Pope Paul VI to take action against oppressive attitude of the South Vietnam towards Buddhist in 1963¹⁰.

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Pro. American government of the South Vietnam's policy was also condemned by the Buddhist Committee of Nepal.¹¹ Since then several incidents were occurred frequently to influence the already tense situation that was drawing up to take a shape of wider repercussion in the internal politics which involved the North Vietnam on the side of National Liberation front into the conflict. The situation gradually deteriorated as also US involved on the side of the South Vietnam. Subsequently, an incident occurred in the Gulf of Tonkin, which became a major source for disturbing the peace and security. On August 26, 1964 Tulsī Giri viewed it as "a danger to world peace"¹².

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The Vietnam crisis, thereafter, had slowly and gradually affected the peace and security of the region with due effect at the global politics. Small nations including Nepal considered the growing intensity of attacks by US forces at NLF strong hold areas and defence installations deep inside the North Vietnam as 'serious threat to the existence of a small nation' and its security and independence and demanded that the bombing raids should be stopped immediately. King Mahendra on May 24, 1964 said in a press conference that the bombing attacks on any nation could not be approved and mere shouting will also be of no avail and the action could not be appreciated.¹³ His Majesty's observation was itself an indication that Nepal could not favour the aggressive threats to settle the issues, as it believed that the use of force would not pay to ultimate and to resolve the problems. The people of various shade did also expressed their feelings and sentiments on the incidents and extended their support to the Vietnamese people and condemned the US action in escalating the conflict through bombing raids, and involving the region into the cold war politics.¹⁴ A spokesman of the Foreign ministry, earlier had called for immediate cessation of

hostilities and pursuit of peaceful means for settling the dispute.¹⁵ Nepal neither pursued a Sino-Soviet line nor it encouraged anti-US hysteria or it contemplated to instigate common people and students to work against a friendly nation. The people and students community expressed their sentiments and feelings in favour of Vietnamese people's struggle were completely a gesture of Asian solidarity and good will. An English daily had commented, "we disagree with the US policy in Vietnam, but we protest even vehemently against Nepal's foreign policy being used as a pretext to favour a third and fourth country"¹⁶.

Though, the Nepalese government had a more or less cautious stand on the growing Vietnamese conflict, the anti-US feelings were running high among press-media, students, elite community and politically conscious people. But, the government did not like that this anti-attitude should not disturb the friendly relations due to increased influence of the foreign influences over the left forces. Because it did not want that there should be outside pressure in the expression of the opinion. It wanted to remain friendly to all.¹⁷ That was why it pursued a very cautious policy on the crisis.

As the situation there gradually turned more serious on July 4, 1961, the Rastriya Panchayat passed unanimously a resolution condemning the increased US bombing raids.¹⁸ Resolutions were also adopted by the Nepal University Teacher's Association and Lalitpur District Panchayat disapproving the raids¹⁹ and Nepal Peace Council observed a Vietnam day in which the action of the US was criticised.²⁰ The intention behind this protests had been to show that the Nepalese people did not like the killings of innocent people in Vietnam and escalation of the conflict, instead they favoured for de-escalation of armed conflict, for maintenance of peace, and for allowing people of Vietnam to decide their destiny themselves without outside interference. In order to end the outside interference, King Mahendra had expressed that the UN could act to eliminate the political influence and could allow the states of the region to live in the principle of live and let live.²¹

This Nepalese stand on the Vietnam crisis was vividly based on the objective analysis of the conditions, factors, issues that had involved in it and policies, actions pursued by the Super Powers and the will power of Vietnamese people to defend their territory independence and sovereignty. Secondly, the existence and Survival of small nations due to excessive intermingling of political and military influences from foreign powers had also casted some effect on the foreign policy assessment of Nepal. Because, being a small nation it had to be careful and alert about the question of interferences of any kind that would threatened

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the freedom, existence and independence. That is why, it had considered the doctrine of interference as enemy to small states, and had opposed it when and where it had been used by the foreign powers to get their objectives fulfilled. The Vietnam policy was totally based to oppose the influences, interferences and interventions and to consolidate the move for restoration of peace initiatives. If one looks into this policy, he will find that it is somewhat in consensus with the general non-aligned policy on Vietnam crisis.

On integration and peace in Vietnam, its policy had been to oppose the hurdlistic approach of the powers concerned to integrate the two halves of Vietnam, because powers whose interests were at stake there, had created problems in the way for the integration and restoration of peace as the divergent political systems in the two halves and political instability in the South and war, hurdles for peace and integration. The problems became a distant dream to be realised by the Vietnamese people. The hostile condition turned into the major confrontation leading to outbreak of war. The period between 1968-73 was a period of peace and escalation, as the parties to crisis had a slow trodding towards peace. A peace initiative was taken by President Johnson to end the war. Peace talk began in Paris between North Vietnam and the US. Nepal had welcomed the move, as it would help to end the crisis, and allow people to live in peace. During this period the region witnessed change in the government in Cambodia. A new government headed by Gen. Lon Nol with the support of the US was installed in place Prince Nordom Sihanouk and Paris peace talk was bogged down.

The main reason behind the changes in Cambodia was to show an expression of resentment against Sihanouk's policy towards left forces operating near Vietnam-Cambodian border, which provided a supply line to left forces in the South Vietnam by the US and right wing faction in the Cambodian politics. This change provided a favourable climate to the US to operate against the communist trogg hold area in the border and to cut the supply line to the South Vietnam. Thus, Cambodia was dragged into the escalating Vietnam war, as the US engaged to attack these strong positions and launched bombing raids over North Vietnam. The peace initiative, which had begun in Paris began to drag in the midst of region US raids. A policy of 'pause and attack' was pursued by it. Nepal watched these development with concern and interest. The Nepalese foreign minister K.N. Bista said that "...Nepal always desires peace. Nepal, therefore, hopes that the Paris talk will result in some achievement²²" and again on September 19, 1968, he said about it that in order to achieve success in negotiation the military activities must be stopped.²³

But, while the talk was continued and slowly dragging on the bombing raids were continued with occasional pauses. Both parties had kept the door open for peace talk. Every nation prayed for its success. On Comboidan problem the foreign minister Gayanendra Bahadur Karki, said that the Combodian neutrality should be respected and foreign troops must be withdrawn from there.²⁴ The great powers agreed to neutralise Laos and Comboida in the Geneva Armistic Agreement of 1954. So it felt that its neutrality must be respected by all. On June 29, 1970 King Mahendra reaffirmed the Nepalese stand on Comboida and added that Nepal believed every nation should be free to determine its own destiny without outside interference and solving of the problems through negotiation not through military measures.²⁵ Not only government had voiced its concern over the problem but press, students, elite communities also condemned the action because it changed the whole complexion of Combodia, which helped towards the extension of US involvement in the Indo-China to bring the states of the region under its 'strategic-influence' and domination "it was an act of imperialist nature"²⁶. This change in Combodia brought new strategic alignment in the region to check the communist pressures in the South Vietnam. An axis consisting Phnom Penn-Vietnam-saigon-Bangkok was formed as a part of Nixon doctrine²⁷ to protect the US strategical interests in the region and to make the war a localised affairs. However, the handling of the Vietnam war and its escalation was criticised and condmeed by the Nepalese people. The government had a 'neutral positive' approach in voicing its concern over the US policies there. The press considered them as 'illusionary' one.²⁸ Because they doubted whether the US would be able to check the growing nationalist feeling of NLF or it would help to aggravate the already worsed situation there and put hurldes to the peace talk. Nepal feared that the complex conditions might pose a serious challenge to peace. King Mahendra at Lusaka non-alligned summit conference observed that the induction of foreign troops had complicated the already existing complex situation, so the external interference in Indo-China must end allow the nations of the region to choose their own future.²⁹ But it seemed that the complex situation would not improve due to increased bombing raids and other military offensives. Though the Nepelase people had expressed their sympathy with the Inod-Chinese people³⁰, it had no bearing to give them despite from the scourge of war. As the sufferings increased, a four members delegation led by the North Vietnamese leader Tran Duang Khao visited Nepal on November 19, 1970 to explain their views on the US role. The delegate demanded for withdrawl of the US troops, and removal of the puppet government of the South Vietnam in order

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to resolve the crises.³¹ It received the moral support from the Nepalese people in their nation's just struggle against the foreign powers influence and domination. Nepal had supported the call for foreign powers troops withdrawal and creation of a congenial atmosphere for peace settlement. In pursuant with this policy, it had also regretted the action of the foreign powers influence in Laos, and considered it as an infringement or violation of the Geneva Accord of 1962 in Laos which had reaffirmed its neutrality.³² With this, Laos was also dragged into the Indo-Chinese conflict and Nepal kept its views expressed freely to each event that had affected and added elements to intensify the conflict. A student demonstration was held on March 9, 1971 in front of the US Embassy and demanded for cessation of 'increased bombing raids and stoppage of aggressive postures on other Indo-Chinese states.

Towards the escalation of war and aggressive postures, which had created a tense climate in the region, a local daily paper 'Jandut' commented that it was a work of an 'imperialist power' who had ousted Sihanouk from the power and committed 'genocide' in Vietnam. It was the power who was unable to reconcile with the nationalism and national liberation movement of the Indo-Chinese people³³, because all the three states; Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam were gradually brought under the broader concept of the US war strategy, It became very difficult for the US to withdraw from the region as it was not prepared to leave its supporters in difficult situation. By way of escalating the war, it wanted to have equal footing and share at the Paris peace talk for other party i.e. South Vietnam. But, with the coming of the President Richard M. Nixon, there had been an indication to end the war through his policy of Vietnamisation and to create ways for the withdrawal of the US. Secondly, he gave more attention to the Paris Talk.

The main objective of the new US policy was to have an favourable environment that would help and assist the negotiation at Paris and would also enhance the already depleted position of the US within and outside the country.

The Paris Talk

The Paris negotiation was continuing with frequent break from 1968 between Xaun Thuy and Cyrus Vance. But it got momentum at later phase. The negotiatory task was assigned to Henry Kissinger and Lee Duc Tho. It achieved success after continuous hard and tough negotiation in the midst of 'pause and strike' US strategical policy and counter offensives from the NLF and North Vietnamese forces. Originally, Nepal and welcomed the initiation of the talk and felt relieved as the talk was heading towards settlement. However, it did not like the

renewed bombing raids over the North Vietnam with occasional pauses.³⁴ Intellectuals and leaders Surya Bahadur Thapa, Surya Prasad Upadhyaya, Rishikesh Shaha and others felt that the US stand on the bombing raids and its occasional outburst might affect the process of the peace talk and called for its cessation.³⁵ However, the US kept on its 'pressure tactics' through the bombing raids, which was condemned by the North Vietnamese. They considered as a Violation of an understanding between them, while US felt that it was not case of violation. The defence secretary termed it as a 'protective action'.³⁶ In spite of these hostile actions, the peace talk at Paris difficult by progressed. To the hostile activities, the Nepalese prime minister Kirtnidhi Bista on July 6, 1972 said that Nepal had been opposing air raids over the North Vietnam from the beginning as it would not help to resolve the crisis.³⁷ It favoured its solution through negotiation³⁸, as a deadlock persisted in the talk due to the US rejection to seven points peace the proposal of the NLF which had support of North Vietnam. Its leader Thich Thien Huwa had talked about it with the Nepalese leaders during his visit.³⁹ The Prime Minister K.N. Bista about the stall in the talk said that it was natural for Nepal to feel distressed over the new complication that had cropped up in the already complex situation of Vietnamese problem and hoped that the main hurdles in the path of peace talk would be removed to arrive at agreed peace settlement.⁴⁰

A secret negotiation initiative conducted by Henry Kissinger and Lee Duc Thao cleared the way for success in the talk. The US acceded the demand for the participation of the Vietcongs in the commission to supervise the new election after cease-fire⁴¹ and it also agreed to withdraw from the Indo-China. A long and tired diplomatic negotiation came to an end with the signing of the agreement on January 27, 1973. The agreement provided for cease-fire, release of American prisoners, respect for neutrality of Laos and Cambodia and unification of Vietnam. Till re-unification, a joint government consisting of Thieu faction and NLF would be establish in the South and the US would withdraw its troops from the area.⁴¹ The agreement was generally welcomed by Nepal and it hoped that it would assist in restoring peace and stability in the region. His Majesty King Birendra speaking at Algiers summit conference of the non-aligned states on September 8, 1973 viewed that, if

"...the provision of Paris Peace Agreement are scrupulously observed by all sides and legitimate aspirations of the people to live in peace be honoured ..."

the peace would be preserved in the Vietnam as well as in the whole of Indo-China. King Hoped that the legitimate wish of the

Vietnamese people to live in peace would be realised and

...the Paris peace agreement on Vietnam would eventually be helpful in bringing peace... This, we believe, is possible only with withdrawal of all foreign interference so that people of Cambodia may freely decide their own destiny and live in peace.⁴³

Nepal felt happy to see the emergence of Vietnam as unified state in April 1976 after liberating the South Vietnam from Thieu regime with armed clashes between his loyal forces and the National Liberation Front forces; and after the formation of Vietcong led government in Saigon by April, 1975. Earlier this new government and the North Vietnamese government worked together for unification process. Under an agreement on November 21, 1975, they had agreed to hold a General Election in the first half of 1976 to form a unified socialist state, and the people of Vietnam would elect their representatives to a unified common National Assembly on April 25, 1976 which would have 492 seats. The people of both halves of Vietnam exercised their voting right and elected their representatives to the National Assembly. The election was a step towards declaration of unification.⁴⁴ The Assembly formally approved the formation of the Republic of Vietnam. Non-aligned concept became the basis for its foreign policy. A new member was added to the NAM from the region which had for the first time feeling the dawn of freedom after long drawn freedom struggle to liberate the country from colonial rule and foreign interferences. This policy became suitable to needs and aspirations and national interest to the Vietnamese people. Consequently, it became partner-in arms with Nepal in the Non-aligned Movement.

Earlier on May 16, 1975 both the nations had agreed to establish diplomatic relation at Embassy level, and Nepal had also given its recognition to the revolutionary government of the south Vietnam.⁴⁵ With Cambodia also it agreed to establish diplomatic relation.⁴⁶ These developments at diplomatic level opened the contact between Nepal and the Indo-Chinese states. Hence forward, Nepal and the nations of the region had developed their relations. It was concerning watching the new development that was sweeping the region i.e. communication of the states by the end of 1975. A complete different political milieu emerged which seemed to be acting as a composite threat to the non-communist states of the South East Asian region, and also it had given new impetus in the relationship between USSR and China as Vietnam asserted its position in the Indo-Chinese states with support of Soviets. Soon, the clouds of peace began to disappear from the area and conflicts among the communist rivals began to surface in Cambodia involving local power Vietnam. Nepal felt that these new development would not

help to meet the needs for peace, stability, and independence, if the foreign powers try to mingle in the internal politics of the Kampuchea. Nepal disfavoured the role of Vietnam in Kampuchea by pursuing a definite policy on the issue within the doctrine of intervention.

IV

To conclude, Nepal, as a small sensitive geo-strategical country having a different political set-up than those prevailing around her, had its own perceptive analytical tools to evaluate the Vietnam issue on its national interests and national objectives-goals and ends within the basic tenets of the non-aligned theory. It had taken its stand clearly in tune of morality, objectivity, necessity and desire for peace. It considered peace as an ultimate end for development and progress, and political stability. Outside interferences (Political and military nature) in the internal affairs constitute a threat to an established order and create a political disorder affecting very survival of the state, so it had opposed the principle of interference of any kind that virtually affect the very existence of state independence and sovereignty. That is why, it had raised its voice against it which had disturbed peace and stability in the Vietnam and supported the idea or call for the withdrawal of foreign troops, right of self-determination to decide her destiny without outside interference.

The 'interventionism' as pursued in the modern international politics by the powers is the "contrary to unique genius of the nation as expressed in the domestic traditions and the best of its foreign policy"⁵⁶. Because no nation would like that the concept of intervention should get wide place in the international politics as it marred the freedom of action and undue importance to foreign powers. So Nepal feels that it is counter productive because it generates conflicts and involvement of foreign elements in it. Vietnamese issue is the product of this policy. So it believes in the proposition that

... conflict must be avoided because they are too dangerous and prone to escalation, and they can be avoided because nuclear weapons plus other transformations in the international environment generate presumption against the use of force and alternative to it.⁵⁷

That is why, it had constantly expressed its views against the emergence of the conflict like in Vietnam and its escalation to threaten peace of the region too. So, in order to keep peace there and elsewhere force should not be used, if this had been used as in the case of Kampuchea, it should be withdrawn immediately and unconditionally⁵⁸ to allow people to decide their destiny. On the whole, Nepal on the Vietnam issue had spoken independently and within the meaning is its national interests, objectives, goals and ends of the foreign policy

besides taking into the trends and political environments of the Indo-Chinese region including the Big Powers role. Nepal had exposed itself against the principle of interventions and interferences, and constantly maintained that stand where interventions were taking place there.

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